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Abstract
How do perceptual decision-making and auditory perceptual grouping interact on a perceptual,
computational, and neural level? The work in this dissertation lays the groundwork to investigate the neural
basis for auditory perceptual decisions by examining the perceptual and computational effects of the temporal
structure of an auditory stimulus. I examined the role of auditory perceptual grouping on auditory perceptual
judgments by asking whether the presentation rate of a stimulus sequence, which can affect the perceptual
grouping of the stimulus, affects how sensory evidence converted into a decision. I devised a task that allows
us to test, under different grouping conditions, whether the observed performance was consistent with
changes in the representation of sensory evidence used to make the perceptual judgment or in the process by
which the sensory evidence is converted into the decision. Subjects made a judgment on the frequency
changes over time of a tone sequences while the interburst interval (IBI), or the time between tones of the
stimulus, was varied across trials. I examined how subjects processed the sensory evidence to form their
decisions as well as modeled the effect of IBI on their decision-making process. The results show that subjects
accumulated sensory evidence over time to form their judgment and while IBI and perceived grouping did not
affect the accumulation rate, subjects accumulated less total sensory evidence for long IBIs consistent with a
collapsing decision boundary. By understanding how the brain converts sensory stimuli into a perceptual
decision with our task, we can better understand the computational principles and the neural implementation
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ABSTRACT	  TEMPORAL	  PROCESSING	  IN	  AUDITORY	  PERCEPTUAL	  GROUPING	  AND	  DECISION-­‐MAKING	  Andrew	  S.	  K.	  Liu	  Yale	  E.	  Cohen	  How	   do	   perceptual	   decision-­‐making	   and	   auditory	   perceptual	   grouping	  interact	   on	   a	   perceptual,	   computational,	   and	   neural	   level?	   The	   work	   in	   this	  dissertation	   lays	   the	   groundwork	   to	   investigate	   the	   neural	   basis	   for	   auditory	  perceptual	  decisions	  by	  examining	  the	  perceptual	  and	  computational	  effects	  of	  the	  temporal	   structure	   of	   an	   auditory	   stimulus.	   I	   examined	   the	   role	   of	   auditory	  perceptual	   grouping	   on	   auditory	   perceptual	   judgments	   by	   asking	   whether	   the	  presentation	  rate	  of	  a	  stimulus	  sequence,	  which	  can	  affect	  the	  perceptual	  grouping	  of	  the	  stimulus,	  affects	  how	  sensory	  evidence	  converted	  into	  a	  decision.	  I	  devised	  a	  task	   that	   allows	   us	   to	   test,	   under	   different	   grouping	   conditions,	   whether	   the	  observed	  performance	  was	  consistent	  with	  changes	  in	  the	  representation	  of	  sensory	  evidence	   used	   to	   make	   the	   perceptual	   judgment	   or	   in	   the	   process	   by	   which	   the	  sensory	  evidence	   is	   converted	   into	   the	  decision.	  Subjects	  made	  a	   judgment	  on	   the	  frequency	  changes	  over	  time	  of	  a	  tone	  sequences	  while	  the	  interburst	  interval	  (IBI),	  or	  the	  time	  between	  tones	  of	  the	  stimulus,	  was	  varied	  across	  trials.	  I	  examined	  how	  subjects	  processed	  the	  sensory	  evidence	  to	  form	  their	  decisions	  as	  well	  as	  modeled	  the	   effect	   of	   IBI	   on	   their	   decision-­‐making	   process.	   The	   results	   show	   that	   subjects	  accumulated	  sensory	  evidence	  over	  time	  to	  form	  their	  judgment	  and	  while	  IBI	  and	  perceived	  grouping	  did	  not	  affect	  the	  accumulation	  rate,	  subjects	  accumulated	  less	  
  v 
total	  sensory	  evidence	  for	  long	  IBIs	  consistent	  with	  a	  collapsing	  decision	  boundary.	  By	  understanding	  how	  the	  brain	  converts	  sensory	  stimuli	  into	  a	  perceptual	  decision	  with	  our	  task,	  we	  can	  better	  understand	  the	  computational	  principles	  and	  the	  neural	  implementation	  of	  how	  auditory	  percepts	  are	  formed.	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We	   inform	   our	   decisions	   by	   inferring	   the	   state	   of	   the	   world,	   which	   is	   a	  process	   called	   perceptual	   decision-­‐making.	   This	   process	   uses	   information	   from	   a	  stimulus	  to	  make	  a	  categorical	  judgment	  about	  the	  stimulus,	  which	  can	  then	  guide	  a	  behavior,	   such	   as	   a	   motor	   action.	   The	   stimulus	   is	   initially	   transformed	   by	   the	  peripheral	  sensory	  organs,	  such	  as	  the	  retina	  in	  the	  eye	  or	  the	  cochlea	  in	  the	  inner	  ear,	   into	   a	   neural	   representation	   of	   the	   physical	   variables	   of	   the	   stimulus.	   The	  cochlea,	   for	   example,	   transforms	   the	   acoustic	   stimulus,	   a	   time-­‐varying	   pressure	  waveform,	   into	  a	  neural-­‐code	   representing	   the	  physical	   attributes	  of	   the	   stimulus,	  such	  as	  the	  frequency	  content	  of	  the	  acoustic	  waveform.	  As	  sensory	  information	  is	  processed	   further	   downstream,	   through	   the	   midbrain	   and	   then	   to	   the	   cerebral	  cortex,	   the	   information	   represented	   by	   neurons	   is	   transformed	   from	   a	  representation	   primarily	   encoding	   the	   physical	   attributes	   of	   the	   stimulus	   to	   a	  representation	   that	   is	   more	   closely	   related	   to	   the	   perceptual	   report.	   This	  transformation	   is	   typically	   thought	   to	   have	   two	   parts:	   first,	   the	   stimulus	   features	  that	   correspond	   to	   the	   relevant	   perceptual	   dimensions	   for	   the	   judgment	   are	  extracted	  from	  early	  sensory	  representations	  by	  the	  downstream	  neurons;	  second,	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this	  higher-­‐level	  representation	  of	  the	  relevant	  sensory	  evidence	  for	  the	  decision	  is	  converted	   by	   neurons	   further	   downstream	   into	   a	   perceptual	   decision,	   which	  typically	  correlates	  well	  with	  the	  behavioral	  report	  (Shadlen	  &	  Newsome	  2001).	  In	  this	   dissertation,	   I	   explore	   the	   behavioral	   and	   computational	   basis	   for	   the	  transformation	  of	  an	  auditory	  stimulus	  into	  a	  perceptual	  decision.	  By	  understanding	  how	   the	   brain	   represents	   sensory	   stimuli	   and	   how	   sensory	   information	   is	  transformed	   into	   a	   perceptual	   decision,	   we	   can	   gain	   insight	   into	   the	   neural	  mechanisms	  that	  allow	  us	  to	  adaptively	  interact	  with	  the	  environment.	  	  Towards	   the	   goal	   of	   understanding	   the	   neural	   representation	   of	   auditory	  stimuli	   and	   the	   conversion	   from	   sensory	   stimuli	   into	   auditory	   percepts,	   in	   this	  dissertation	  I	  am	  investigating	  how	  certain	  perceptual	  decisions	  are	  affected	  by	  the	  processing	  of	   the	   temporal	   structure	  of	   an	  auditory	   stimulus.	  Auditory	  perception	  depends	  on	  the	  brain	  extracting	  and	  analyzing	  the	  temporal	  structure	  of	  a	  stimulus.	  For	  example,	  the	  temporal	  structure	  of	  a	  Bach	  concerto	  for	  two	  violins	  is	  one	  factor	  that	   allows	   a	   listener	   to	   separate	   out	   the	   different	   parts	   corresponding	   to	   each	  violin.	   To	   separate	   out	   the	   different	   parts	   of	   the	   concerto	   for	   two	   violins,	   the	  auditory	  system	  uses	  the	  temporal	  structure	  of	  the	  auditory	  stimulus	  to	  separate	  the	  incoming	   stimulus	   into	   two	   perceptual	   representations,	   corresponding	   to	   each	   of	  the	   two	   violin	   parts	   (Bregman	   1994).	   This	   process	   is	   called	   auditory	   perceptual	  grouping.	  	  Auditory	   perceptual	   grouping	   converts	   the	   sensory	   representation	   of	   an	  auditory	  stimulus	   into	   the	  perceptual	   representation	  of	  an	  auditory	  stimulus.	  This	  
  3 
process,	  which	  itself	  depends	  on	  the	  temporal	  structure	  of	  the	  stimulus,	  may	  affect	  the	  processing	  of	  the	  stimulus	  to	  extract	  perceptually	  relevant	  information	  from	  the	  stimulus	  as	  well	  as	  how	  this	  information	  is	  converted	  into	  a	  categorical	  perceptual	  decision.	  For	  many	  perceptual	  tasks,	  this	  transformation	  of	  the	  sensory	  information	  into	   a	   perceptual	   decision	   depends	   on	   combining	   multiple	   samples	   of	   sensory	  information	   over	   time	   in	   order	   to	   deal	   with	   unreliable	   sensory	   information	  (Mauzrek	   et	   al	   2003,	   Gold	   &	   Shadlen	   2007,	   Shadlen	   &	   Kiani	   2013).	   While	   some	  recent	   studies	   have	   explored	   the	   effect	   of	   the	   stimulus	   temporal	   structure	   on	   the	  perceptual	   decision-­‐making	   process	   (Kiani	   et	   al	   2013,	   Brunton	   &	   Brody	   2013),	  whether	   auditory	   perceptual	   grouping	   affects	   the	   process	   of	   combining	   multiple	  samples	   of	   sensory	   information	   over	   time	   to	   make	   a	   decision	   remains	   to	   be	  explored.	  In	  this	  dissertation,	  I	  used	  human	  auditory	  psychophysics	  to	  examine	  the	  role	  of	  temporal	  processing	  in	  auditory	  perceptual	  decision-­‐making.	  Specifically,	  my	  goal	  was	  to	  establish	  a	  novel	  auditory	  task	  in	  humans	  to	  test	  how	  the	  presentation	  rate	  of	  a	   tone	   sequence	   affected	   how	   subjects	   converted	   the	   stimulus	   into	   a	   perceptual	  judgment	   on	   how	   the	   frequencies	   of	   the	   tone	   sequence	   change	   over	   time.	   To	  understand	  how	  auditory	   grouping	  based	  on	   the	   temporal	   structure	  of	   a	   stimulus	  affects	   the	   transformation	   of	   the	   stimulus	   into	   a	   perceptual	   decision,	   subjects’	  accuracy	  as	  well	  as	  the	  time	  needed	  to	  make	  a	  perceptual	  judgment	  was	  measured	  while	   performing	   a	   perceptual	   task	   and	   across	   trials,	   the	   stimulus	   temporal	  structure	   was	   varied.	   I	   used	   the	   drift	   diffusion	   model,	   a	   computational	   model	   of	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decision-­‐making	  process,	  to	  relate	  the	  stimulus	  information	  on	  a	  given	  trial	  to	  both	  the	  accuracy	  and	  the	  time	  needed	  to	  make	  a	   judgment.	  This	  model	  simultaneously	  accounts	   for	   both	   measures	   of	   subject	   performance	   on	   the	   perceptual	   task.	   By	  examining	  how	  the	  model	  differed	  across	  the	  different	  stimulus	  temporal	  structure	  conditions,	  my	  aim	  was	  to	  test	  whether	  the	  temporal	  structure	  of	  the	  stimulus,	  and	  specifically	  auditory	  grouping,	  had	  an	  effect	  on	  the	  decision-­‐making	  process.	  Here,	  I	  will	   first	   review	   the	   background	   for	   how	   the	   temporal	   structure	   of	   an	   auditory	  stimulus	  affects	  how	  sounds	  are	  perceived.	  Then,	  I	  will	  review	  the	  approach	  I	  used	  to	   study	   the	   effect	   of	   the	   stimulus	   temporal	   structure	   on	   auditory	   perceptual	  decisions.	  Finally,	  I	  will	  conclude	  with	  a	  summary	  of	  the	  aims	  of	  this	  dissertation.	  	  
Stimulus	  Temporal	  Structure	  and	  Auditory	  Perception	  To	  hear	  sounds	  and	  to	  use	  sound	  information	  to	  guide	  behavior,	  our	  auditory	  system	   transforms	   acoustic	   stimuli	   into	   a	   perceptual	   representation	   (Griffiths	   &	  Warren	   2004;	   Bizley	   &	   Cohen	   2013).	   These	   perceptual	   representations,	   also	  referred	   to	   as	   auditory	   objects,	   form	   the	   basis	   of	   our	   experience	   of	   the	   auditory	  environment.	   Auditory	   objects	   are	   the	   perceptual	   entity	   representing	   an	  experienced	   sound,	   corresponding	   to	   a	   particular	   sound	   source	   or	   sound	   event.	  Forming	   these	   perceptual	   representations	   depend	   on	   analyzing	   and	   extracting	  behaviorally	   relevant	   information	   from	   the	   acoustic	   stimulus	   that	   may	   evolve	  through	  time	  and	  may	  even	  be	  separated	  in	  time.	  For	  example,	  the	  brain	  is	  able	  to	  selectively	   process	   the	   pitches	   of	   musical	   notes	   separated	   in	   time	   to	   form	   a	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perceptual	  representation	  of	  the	  part	  of	  a	  melody	  being	  played	  by	  an	  instrument	  as	  part	  of	  a	   trio.	  This	  process	  begins	   in	   the	  cochlea,	  where	  the	  time-­‐varying	  pressure	  waveform	   of	   the	   acoustic	   stimulus	   is	   converted	   into	   neural	   activity.	   Downstream	  areas	   in	   the	   brain	   convert	   this	   sensory	   representation	   based	   on	   the	   physical	  attributes	   of	   the	   stimulus	   into	   a	   perceptual	   representation	   that	  we	   experience	   as	  sound.	  	  Several	  experimental	  paradigms	  have	  been	  used	   to	  explore	  how	  perceptual	  representations	   are	   formed	   from	   the	   sensory	   information	   extracted	   from	   the	  stimulus	   (Van	   Noorden	   1975,	   Kidd	   et	   al	   1994,	   Kidd	   et	   al	   2003,	   Bregman	   1994,	  Bregman	   et	   al	   2000,	   Nelken	   et	   al	   1999),	   but	   one	   common	   process	   that	   has	   been	  implicated	  in	  the	  formation	  of	  the	  perceptual	  representations	  is	  auditory	  perceptual	  grouping	   (Bregman	   1990,	   Bizley	   &	   Cohen	   2013,	   Shamma	   et	   al	   2011).	   Auditory	  perceptual	   grouping	   tries	   to	   explain	   how	   the	   low-­‐level,	   physical	   attributes	   of	   a	  stimulus	   are	   converted	   into	   a	   perceptual	   representation.	   The	   auditory	   perceptual	  grouping	   process	   extracts	   perceptual	   representations	   for	   the	   different	   auditory	  objects	  present	  in	  the	  stimulus	  and	  is	  based	  on	  the	  principles	  of	  Gestalt	  psychology.	  An	  acoustic	  scene	  is	  a	  mixture	  of	  acoustic	  waves	  from	  different	  sound	  sources	  that	  can	  either	  be	  perceived	  as	  a	  whole,	  or	  as	  the	  elements	  that	  comprise	  the	  scene.	  For	  example,	   a	   jazz	   trio	   can	   be	   perceived	   as	   a	   unified	   whole,	   or	   as	   the	   individual	  components,	   as	   the	  pianist,	  bass,	  or	  vocalist	  parts	  of	   the	   trio.	  According	   to	  Gestalt	  principles,	   the	  perception	  of	   the	  unified	  scene,	   like	   the	   trio	  playing	  a	   jazz	  piece,	   is	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not	   just	   the	   combination	  of	   the	  percepts	  of	   the	  elements	  of	   the	   scene,	   such	  as	   the	  different	  parts	  of	  the	  trio,	  but	  an	  entirely	  distinct	  perceptual	  entity.	  	  While	   substantial	   progress	   has	   been	   made	   to	   understand	   the	   stimulus	  parameters	   that	   promote	   auditory	   perceptual	   grouping,	   how	   cortical	   auditory	  neurons	   implement	   the	   auditory	   perceptual	   grouping	   process	   to	   transform	   the	  sensory	  input	  into	  a	  high-­‐level	  perceptual	  representation	  remains	  to	  be	  elucidated.	  While	   top-­‐down	   factors	   such	  as	  attention	  certainly	   can	  play	  a	   role	   in	   the	  auditory	  perceptual	   grouping	   process	   (Lakatos	   et	   al	   2013,	   Bey	   &	   McAdams	   2002),	   the	  grouping	  process	  is	  typically	  driven	  by	  bottom-­‐up	  factors	  derived	  from	  the	  physical	  attributes	  of	  a	  stimulus	  (Bregman	  1994,	  Hartman	  &	  Johnson	  1991,	  Beauvois	  1998,	  Bregman	   et	   al	   2000,	   Bizley	   &	   Cohen	   2013).	   Bottom-­‐up,	   or	   stimulus-­‐driven,	  perceptual	  grouping	  relies	  on	  regularities	  of	  the	  spectral	  and	  temporal	  structure	  of	  a	  stimulus	   to	   allow	  different	   stimulus	   components	   to	  be	   grouped	   together.	  Acoustic	  features	   such	   as	   spectral	   and	   temporal	   proximity	   of	   the	   different	   stimulus	  components	   as	   well	   as	   similar	   spectral	   and	   amplitude	   modulation	   over	   time	  contribute	  to	  the	  bottom-­‐up	  processing.	  For	  example,	  the	  frequency	  separation	  and	  the	  presentation	  rate	  of	  an	  ‘ABA’	  tone	  triplet	  (where	  A	  and	  B	  represent	  tones	  with	  different	   frequencies),	   can	  determine	  whether	  subjects	  perceive	  a	   sequence	  of	   the	  tone	   triplets	   as	   a	   “gallop”	   or	   trill	   versus	   as	   two	   “streams”	   or	   two	   separate,	   but	  continuously	  playing	  tones.	  	  In	   this	   dissertation,	   I	   am	   interested	   in	   how	   auditory	   perceptual	   grouping,	  which	   affects	   whether	   a	   stimulus	   is	   grouped	   into	   a	   unified	   perceptual	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representation	  or	  separated	  into	  distinct	  perceptual	  representations	  and	  is	  based	  on	  the	   temporal	  structure	  of	  a	  stimulus,	  affects	   the	  process	   that	  converts	   the	  sensory	  information	  into	  a	  judgment.	  The	  perceptual	  representation	  of	  a	  stimulus	  may	  affect	  how	  sensory	  information	  is	  extracted	  and	  converted	  into	  a	  perceptual	  decision.	  The	  hypothesized	  effect	  is	  that	  when	  the	  stimulus	  is	  represented	  by	  a	  unified,	  grouped,	  perceptual	   representation,	   sensory	   information	   is	  more	   efficiently	   extracted	   from	  the	  stimulus	  than	  if	  the	  stimulus	  were	  not	  grouped	  and	  was	  separated	  into	  distinct	  perceptual	  representations.	  Thus,	  by	  having	  subjects	  make	  a	   judgment	  on	  how	  the	  frequency	  of	  a	  tone	  sequence	  changes	  over	  time	  while	  varying	  the	  presentation	  rate	  of	   the	   tone	   sequence	   across	   trials,	   the	   effects	   of	   auditory	   grouping	   on	   the	   overall	  perceptual	  decision-­‐making	  process	  should	  affect	  subjects'	  accuracy	  as	  well	  as	   the	  amount	  of	  time	  needed	  to	  make	  their	  judgment.	  In	  the	  next	  section,	  I	  will	  explain	  the	  basis	   for	   the	  methods	   that	   quantify	   the	   effect	   of	   auditory	   grouping	   based	   on	   the	  temporal	   structure	   of	   the	   stimulus	   on	   how	   sensory	   information	   is	   processed	   and	  how	  this	  information	  is	  used	  to	  make	  a	  perceptual	  decision.	  	  
	  
Modeling	   perceptual	   decisions	   to	   understand	   auditory	   perceptual	  
processing	  In	   this	  dissertation,	  subjects	  discriminated	  whether	   the	   frequency	  of	  a	   tone	  sequence	  was	  increasing	  or	  decreasing	  over	  time	  while	  the	  presentation	  rate	  of	  the	  tone	  sequence	  varied	  across	   trials.	   I	  used	  computational	  modeling	   to	   test	  whether	  subjects’	   behavioral	   performance	   on	   an	   auditory	   task	   was	   affected	   by	   auditory	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grouping.	   The	   approach	   I	   took	   infers	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   neural	   representation	   of	  sensory	   information	   and	   the	   decision-­‐making	   process	   from	   subjects’	   performance	  on	  a	  perceptual	  task.	  By	  modeling	  subjects’	  performance	  for	  the	  different	  stimulus	  temporal	  structure	  conditions,	  I	  could	  test	  whether	  auditory	  grouping,	  based	  on	  the	  temporal	   structure	   of	   the	   stimulus,	   affected	   the	   extraction	   of	   sensory	   information	  from	   the	   stimulus	   or	   the	   conversion	   of	   the	   sensory	   information	   into	   a	   perceptual	  decision.	   This	   approach	   uses	   the	   drift	   diffusion	  model	   (DDM)	   of	   decision-­‐making	  that	  relates	  the	  physical	  parameters	  of	  a	  stimulus	  to	  subjects’	  accuracy	  as	  well	  as	  the	  time	   they	   took	   to	   make	   a	   decision	   for	   a	   perceptual	   task	   (Gold	   &	   Shadlen	   2007,	  Bogacz	  et	  al	  2006).	  The	  DDM	  is	  based	  on	  signal	  detection	  theory	  (SDT),	  which	  was	  initially	   developed	   to	   account	   for	   the	   variability	   in	   perceptual	   detection	  performance	  due	   to	   the	  noisy	   representation	  of	   sensory	   information	   as	  well	   as	   to	  quantify	   the	   effect	   of	   varying	   stimulus	   parameters	   on	   perception	   (Green	  &	   Swets	  1966).	   The	   DDM	   extends	   signal	   detection	   theory	   to	   relate	   discrimination	  performance,	   both	   accuracy	   and	   the	   time	   it	   takes	   to	   make	   a	   decision,	   to	   the	  perceptually-­‐relevant	   stimulus	   parameters	   (Ratcliff	   &	   Tuerlinckx	   2002,	   Ratcliff	   &	  Smith	   2004,	   Ratcliff	   &	   McKoon	   2008).	   By	   quantifying	   how	   subjects	   make	   their	  decisions	   under	   a	   variety	   of	   listening	   duration	   conditions,	   the	   DDM	   allows	   us	   to	  infer	   how	   the	   sensory	   information	   and	   the	   decision-­‐making	   process	   varies	   under	  different	  stimulus	  timing	  and	  auditory	  perceptual	  grouping	  conditions.	  	  While	  SDT	  allows	  us	  to	  distinguish	  stimulus	  or	  task-­‐related	  factors	  that	  affect	  the	   sensory	   representation	   or	   the	   decision	   criterion,	   it	   does	   not	   account	   for	   how	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long	   subjects	   take	   to	   make	   a	   decision.	   The	   general	   class	   of	   sequential	   sampling	  models	  extends	  the	  SDT	  to	  relate	   the	  stimulus	  parameters	   to	  both	  the	  accuracy	  as	  well	   as	   the	   response	   times	  of	   each	  decision	   (Ratcliff	  &	  Tuerlinckx	  2002,	  Ratcliff	  &	  Smith	   2004,	   Ratcliff	   &	   McKoon	   2008).	   The	   sequential	   sampling	   models,	   which	  include	   the	   DDM,	   make	   the	   key	   assumption	   that	   decisions	   are	   based	   on	   the	  accumulation	  of	  multiple	  samples	  of	  sensory	  evidence.	  The	  accumulation	  of	  sensory	  evidence	  over	  time	  is	  a	  mechanism	  to	  handle	  the	  inherent	  variability	  in	  the	  sensory	  representation.	  This	  variability	  could	  be	  the	  result	  of	  a	  noisy,	  stochastic	  stimulus	  or	  from	   a	   noisy	   neural	   representation	   (Gold	  &	   Shadlen	   2007,	   Shadlen	  &	  Kiani	   2013,	  Roitman	  &	  Shadlen	  2002,	  Mazurek	  et	  al	  2003).	  	  In	  the	  DDM,	  beginning	  at	  the	  start	  of	  the	  trial,	  momentary	  sensory	  evidence	  is	  accumulated	   through	   time	   to	   form	  a	  decision	   variable.	   Variants	   of	   the	  DDM	  make	  different	  assumptions	  of	   the	  nature	  of	   the	  sensory	  evidence.	   In	  the	  standard	  DDM,	  the	  sensory	  evidence	  accumulated	  through	  time	  is	  set	  at	  a	  fixed,	  constant	  mean	  level	  for	   the	   duration	   of	   the	   trial	   (Luce	   1986,	   Smith	   1995,	   Ratcliff	   &	   Tuerlinckx	   2002,	  Ratcliff	  &	  Smith	  2004).	  In	  other	  DDM	  variants,	  such	  as	  the	  leaky	  integration	  model,	  the	   accumulated	   sensory	   evidence	   is	   “leaked”	   away	   at	   a	   constant	   rate	   for	   the	  duration	   of	   the	   trial,	   allowing	   for	   recency	   effects,	  where	   sensory	   information	   that	  was	  processed	  closer	  in	  time	  to	  when	  the	  decision	  was	  made	  would	  have	  a	  greater	  contribution	   to	   the	   decision	   variable	   than	   sensory	   information	   that	   came	   much	  earlier	   in	   the	   trial	   (Usher	   &	   McClelland	   2001).	   These	   models	   where	   the	   key	  parameters	  do	  not	  vary	  during	  the	  duration	  of	  a	  trial,	  or	  are	  “stationary”,	  have	  less	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complex	   expressions	   that	   relate	   accuracy	   to	   the	   time	   it	   takes	   to	  make	   a	   decision,	  thus	   are	   easier	   to	   fit	   than	  more	   general	  DDM	  models	   (Ratcliff	  &	  Tuerlinckx	  2002,	  Shadlen	  et	  al	  2006).	  The	  more	  general	  DDM	  models	  relax	  the	  stationarity	  constraint	  and	  have	   time-­‐varying	  parameters	   that	  can	  vary	  during	  a	   trial,	  which	   increase	   the	  complexity	   of	   the	   model	   and	   therefore	   make	   them	   more	   difficult	   to	   fit	   to	   the	  behavioral	  data.	  In	  these	  models,	  the	  sensory	  evidence	  can	  vary	  as	  a	  function	  of	  time	  according	   to	   a	   power-­‐law	   (Eckhoff	   et	   al	   2008)	   or	   has	   a	   mean	   level	   of	   sensory	  evidence	   that	   varies	   as	   the	   trial	   progresses,	   consistent	   with	   an	   urgency	   or	  confidence	   signal	   that	   pushes	   subjects	   to	   commit	   to	   a	   decision	   rather	   than	  perseverating	  on	  the	  process	  of	  making	  a	  decision	  (Cisek	  et	  al	  2009,	  Churchland	  et	  al	  2008,	  Ditterich	  2006,	  Hanks	  et	  al	  2011).	  The	  goal	  of	  using	  the	  different	  variants	  of	  the	   DDM	   is	   to	   better	   quantify	   how	   auditory	   grouping	   based	   on	   the	   temporal	  structure	  of	  the	  stimulus	  affects	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  sensory	  representation.	  By	  fitting	  the	   subjects’	   performance	   data	   collected	   under	   different	   stimulus	   temporal	  structure	  conditions	  to	  the	  different	  DDM	  variants,	   the	  model	  that	  consistently	  fits	  best	   would	   suggest	   that	   the	   neural	   representation	   might	   have	   features	   that	   are	  consistent	  with	  the	  assumptions	  of	  the	  best	  fitting	  model.	  In	   the	   DDM,	   sensory	   evidence	   is	   accumulated	   as	   the	   decision	   variable	  through	   time.	   A	   decision	   is	   made	   when	   the	   accumulation	   process	   ends.	   The	  termination	   of	   the	   accumulation	   process	   can	   either	   be	   due	   to	   the	   experimental	  control	   of	   the	   stimulus	   duration,	   as	   in	   “fixed	   duration”	   or	   “variable	   duration”	  discrimination	   tasks,	   or	   be	   due	   to	   the	   subject	   deciding	   that	   he	   or	   she	   is	   ready	   to	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commit	   to	   a	   decision	   even	   while	   the	   stimulus	   is	   still	   present.	   In	   the	   case	   of	   the	  experimentally	   controlled	   stimulus	   duration,	   at	   the	   end	   of	   the	   stimulus	  presentation,	   the	   level	   of	   the	   accumulated	   evidence	   is	   compared	   to	   a	   decision	  threshold	   to	  determine	  which	  one	  of	   two	  possible	  choices	   is	  made.	   In	   the	  subject-­‐controlled	  viewing	  or	  listening	  duration	  case,	  the	  sensory	  evidence	  accumulation	  is	  terminated	  when	  the	  accumulated	  evidence	  reaches	  one	  of	  two	  decision	  boundaries,	  corresponding	  to	  each	  of	  the	  two	  choices	  in	  a	  two-­‐choice	  discrimination	  task.	  These	  boundaries	   are	   the	   criteria	   by	  which	   the	   accumulated	   evidence	   is	   converted	   to	   a	  decision.	   Once	   the	   accumulated	   evidence	   reaches	   one	   of	   these	   boundaries,	   a	  decision	   is	   rendered	   according	   to	   the	   boundary	   that	   was	   reached	   and	   typically	  converted	   to	   a	   motor	   command,	   and	   eventually	   a	   behavioral	   report.	   The	  accumulated	   evidence	   boundaries	   reflect	   strategic	   considerations	   based	   on	  maximizing	  benefit	  and	  minimizing	  cost	  for	  the	  decision	  outcomes	  as	  well	  as	  other	  considerations	  such	  as	  the	  urgency	  of	  making	  a	  decision	  or	  confidence	  of	  the	  level	  of	  accumulated	   evidence	   (Ditterich	   2006,	   Churchland	   et	   al	   2008,	   Hanks	   et	   al	   2011,	  Drugowitsch	  2012).	  While	   the	  decision	  outcome	   reflects	  which	  decision	  boundary	  was	  reached,	  the	  time	  from	  the	  start	  of	  the	  accumulation	  process,	  typically	  the	  start	  of	  the	  trial,	   to	  when	  the	  decision	  variable	  reached	  a	  decision	  boundary,	  represents	  the	  decision	  time.	  The	  overall	  reaction	  time	  is	  the	  sum	  of	  the	  decision	  time	  and	  the	  non-­‐decision	  time,	  which	  represents	  the	  time	  for	  the	  decision	  to	  be	  converted	  into	  a	  behavioral	  report.	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Because	   the	   temporal	   structure	   of	   an	   auditory	   stimulus	   can	   affect	   how	   the	  auditory	  system	  perceptually	  represents	  the	  stimulus,	  the	  goal	  of	  this	  dissertation	  is	  to	  test	  whether	  the	  temporal	  structure	  affects	  the	  accuracy	  and	  the	  time	  it	  takes	  to	  make	  a	  perceptual	  decision	  as	  well	  as	  to	  explore	  how	  the	  temporal	  structure	  might	  affect	   decision	  performance.	  By	  using	   the	  DDM	  model,	   I	   can	  quantify	   the	   effect	   of	  auditory	   perceptual	   grouping	   as	   well	   as	   the	   processing	   of	   the	   stimulus	   temporal	  structure	  on	  both	  the	  process	  of	  extracting	  sensory	  information	  from	  the	  stimulus	  to	  guide	   a	  perceptual	   judgment	   and	   the	  decision-­‐process	   that	   converts	   the	   extracted	  sensory	   information	   into	   the	   judgment.	   In	   this	   dissertation,	   I	   examine	   whether	  differences	   in	  presentation	  rate	  of	   the	   tone	  sequence	  stimulus	  can	  account	   for	   the	  effects	   on	   decision	   performance,	   consistent	   with	   the	   stimulus	   temporal	   structure	  affecting	   the	   process	   that	   extracts	   decision-­‐related	   sensory	   information	   from	   the	  stimulus.	   I	   also	   test	   whether	   the	   temporal	   structure	   of	   the	   stimulus	   affects	   the	  process	  that	  converts	  the	  sensory	  information	  into	  a	  decision.	  Finally,	  I	  test	  whether	  auditory	  perceptual	  grouping	  specifically	  has	  an	  effect	  on	  the	  process	  of	  extracting	  sensory	   information	   from	   the	   stimulus	   that	   is	   eventually	   used	   to	   make	   the	  perceptual	  judgment.	  
Summary How	   do	   perceptual	   decision-­‐making	   and	   auditory	   perceptual	   grouping	  interact	   on	   a	   perceptual,	   computational,	   and	   neural	   level?	   The	   work	   in	   this	  dissertation	   lays	   the	   groundwork	   to	   investigate	   the	   neural	   basis	   for	   auditory	  perceptual	  decisions	  by	  examining	  the	  perceptual	  and	  computational	  effects	  of	  the	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temporal	   structure	   of	   an	   auditory	   stimulus.	   I	   examined	   the	   role	   of	   auditory	  perceptual	   grouping	   on	   auditory	   perceptual	   judgments	   by	   asking	   whether	   the	  presentation	  rate	  of	  a	  stimulus	  sequence,	  which	  can	  affect	  the	  perceptual	  grouping	  of	  the	  stimulus,	  affects	  how	  sensory	  evidence	  converted	  into	  a	  decision.	  I	  devised	  a	  task	   that	   allows	   us	   to	   test,	   under	   different	   grouping	   conditions,	   whether	   the	  observed	  performance	  was	  consistent	  with	  changes	  in	  the	  representation	  of	  sensory	  evidence	   used	   to	   make	   the	   perceptual	   judgment	   or	   in	   the	   process	   by	   which	   the	  sensory	  evidence	   is	   converted	   into	   the	  decision.	  Subjects	  made	  a	   judgment	  on	   the	  frequency	  changes	  over	  time	  of	  a	  tone	  sequences	  while	  the	  interburst	  interval	  (IBI),	  or	  the	  time	  between	  tones	  of	  the	  stimulus,	  was	  varied	  across	  trials.	  I	  examined	  how	  subjects	  processed	  the	  sensory	  evidence	  to	  form	  their	  decisions	  as	  well	  as	  modeled	  the	  effect	  of	  IBI	  on	  their	  decision-­‐making	  process.	  By	  understanding	  how	  the	  brain	  converts	   sensory	   stimuli	   into	   a	   perceptual	   decision	   with	   our	   task,	   we	   can	   better	  understand	   the	   computational	   principles	   and	   the	   neural	   implementation	   of	   how	  auditory	   percepts	   are	   formed.
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Chapter	  2	  
Integration	   of	   Auditory	   Contour	  
Information	  is	  Invariant	  to	  Time	  Gaps	  and	  
Perceptual	  Grouping	  of	  Stimulus	  
	  
Introduction	  
Time	  plays	  a	  key	  role	  in	  auditory	  perception.	  The	  timing	  of	  acoustic	  events	  in	  a	  stimulus,	  such	  as	  notes	  in	  a	  melody,	  can	  affect	  the	  perceptual	  organization	  of	  the	  stimulus	  (Moore	  &	  Gockel	  2013,	  Shamma	  et	  al	  2011).	  A	  rapid	  sequence	  of	  tones,	  for	  example,	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  perceptually	  grouped	  into	  a	  single	  auditory	  “stream”	  than	   a	   slow	   sequence	  of	   tones	   (Van	  Noorden	  1975,	  Bregman	  1994).	   The	   auditory	  system	   transforms	   low-­‐level	   sensory	   input	   into	   a	   high	   level	   perceptual	  representation	   by	   grouping	   acoustic	   events	   in	   a	   complex	   auditory	   scene	   into	  auditory	   objects	   (Griffiths	  &	  Warren	   2004).	   The	   processing	   of	   low-­‐level	   temporal	  cues	  to	  organize	  perceptually	  the	  incoming	  acoustic	  signal	  is	  fundamental	  (Bizley	  &	  Cohen	  2013)	  to	  allow	  for	  us	  to	  perceive	  sounds	  in	  the	  auditory	  environment.	  Many	  studies	  have	  characterized	   the	   factors	   that	  affect	   auditory	  perceptual	  organization	  (Moore	  &	  Gockel	  2013)	  and	  grouping	  can	  affect	  perceptual	   judgment	  performance	  (Micheyl	  &	  Oxenham	  2010,	  Thompson	  et	  al	  2011,	  Borchert	  et	  al	  2011,	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Roberts	   et	   al	   2002,	   Bey	   &	   McAdams	   2002).	   However,	   because	   of	   the	   task-­‐	   and	  stimulus-­‐dependence	   of	   these	   grouping-­‐related	   effects,	   the	   mechanisms	   that	  contribute	  to	  these	  effects	  are	  unclear.	  For	  example,	  perceptual	  judgments	  of	  timing	  differences	   are	   more	   accurate	   if	   the	   comparison	   is	   made	   within	   a	   stream	   than	  comparisons	   between	   streams	   (Roberts	   et	   al	   2002).	   In	   contrast,	   the	   grouping	   of	  stimuli	   into	  different	   streams	  can	   facilitate	   the	   identification	  of	   a	   tone	   sequence	   if	  the	  sequence	  is	  contained	  within	  one	  stream,	  effectively,	  segregating	  the	  target	  from	  the	   distractor	   (Bey	  &	  McAdams	   2002).	   These	   studies	   raise	   the	   question:	   by	  what	  mechanism	  does	  perceptual	  grouping	  affect	  the	  processing	  of	  sensory	  evidence	  for	  auditory	  perceptual	  judgments?	  	  To	   address	   this,	   we	   examined	   the	   role	   of	   grouping	   on	   auditory	   perceptual	  judgments	  by	  asking	  whether	  time	  gaps	  in	  a	  stimulus	  sequence,	  which	  can	  affect	  the	  perceptual	  grouping	  of	   the	  stimulus,	  affect	  how	  sensory	  evidence	  converted	   into	  a	  decision.	   We	   devised	   a	   task	   that	   allows	   us	   to	   examine,	   under	   different	   grouping	  conditions,	   the	   representation	   of	   sensory	   evidence	   used	   to	   make	   the	   perceptual	  judgment	   and	   the	   process	   by	   which	   the	   sensory	   evidence	   is	   converted	   into	   the	  decision.	   Subjects	   made	   a	   frequency-­‐change	   judgment	   based	   on	   tone	   sequences	  increasing	  or	  decreasing	  in	  frequency	  while	  we	  manipulated	  the	  interburst	  interval,	  or	  the	  time	  between	  tones	  of	  the	  stimulus.	  We	  examined	  how	  subjects	  processed	  the	  sensory	  evidence	  to	  form	  their	  decisions	  as	  well	  as	  modeled	  the	  effect	  of	  IBI	  on	  their	  decision-­‐making	   process.	   We	   found	   that	   subjects	   accumulated	   sensory	   evidence	  over	   time	   to	   form	   their	   judgment	   and	   while	   IBI	   and	   perceived	   grouping	   did	   not	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affect	   the	   accumulation	   rate,	   subjects	   accumulated	   less	   total	   sensory	   evidence	   for	  long	  IBIs	  consistent	  with	  a	  collapsing	  decision	  boundary.	  
Methods	  
Experimental	  Setup	  Subjects	  rested	   their	  chin	  on	  a	  chin	  rest	  approximately	  2’	   from	  the	  speaker	  while	   seated	   in	   a	   soundproof	   booth	   (IAC)	   during	   the	   experiment.	   The	   task	   was	  developed	   using	   the	   MATLAB-­‐based	   Snow-­‐Dots	   (http://code.google.com/p/snow-­‐dots)	   psychophysics	   software.	  On	   each	   trial,	   task	   parameters	   from	   the	   Snow-­‐Dots	  environment	   were	   used	   to	   generate	   the	   stimulus	   on	   a	   digital	   signal	   processor	  (Tucker	   Davis	   Technologies	   RX6).	   The	   stimulus	   was	   presented	   free-­‐field	   using	   a	  calibrated	   speaker	   (Yamaha	   MSP-­‐7).	   Subjects	   responded	   by	   a	   button	   press	   on	   a	  gamepad	  (Microsoft	  Sidewinder)	  and	  task	  instructions	  and	  feedback	  was	  displayed	  on	  a	  LCD	  flat	  panel	  monitor	  (DELL	  E171FP).	  
Stimulus	  The	  stimulus	  was	  a	  tone-­‐burst	  sequence	  (Figure	  1A-­‐D).	  Each	  tone	  burst	  was	  presented	  at	  65	  dB	  SPL	  and	  had	  a	  duration	  of	  30	  ms	  (onset/offsets	  were	  smoothed	  with	  a	  5-­‐ms	  cos2	  gate).	  The	  time	  between	  the	  offset	  of	  one	  tone	  to	  the	  onset	  of	  the	  next	  tone	  (i.e.,	  the	  “inter-­‐burst	  interval”;	  IBI)	  ranged	  between	  10	  and	  150	  ms	  (Figure	  1D).	  The	  range	  of	  IBIs	  chosen	  were	  based	  on	  pilot	  studies	  in	  which	  subjects	  tended	  to	   report	   that	   the	   stimulus	   sounded	   continuous	  when	   the	   IBI	  was	   relatively	   small	  (<50	  ms)	  but	  like	  discrete	  tones	  for	  larger	  IBIs	  (Figure	  2).	  The	  properties	  of	  a	  tone-­‐
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burst	  sequence	  was	  a	   function	  of	   (1)	  sequence	  direction	  (increasing	  or	  decreasing	  frequency),	   (2)	   sequence	   duration,	   (3)	   IBI,	   and	   (4)	   coherence	   (Figure	   1A-­‐C);	   the	  stimulus	   direction,	   duration,	   IBI,	   and	   coherence	   varied	   on	   a	   trial-­‐by-­‐trial	   basis	  depending	  on	  the	  specific	  task	  constraints	  (see	  task	  descriptions	  below).	  	  At	   the	   beginning	   of	   each	   trial,	   the	   frequency	   for	   the	   first	   tone	   burst	   in	   the	  sequence	  was	  randomly	  sampled	  from	  a	  uniform	  distribution	  corresponding	  to	  the	  direction	   of	   the	   stimulus.	   A	   monotonically	   increasing	   or	   decreasing	   frequency	  sequence	  was	  first	  generated	  by	  adding	  or	  subtracting	  a	  fixed	  frequency	  increment	  (Delta_f	  =	  7.5	  hz)	  to	  the	  previous	  tone-­‐burst	  frequency.	  	  Stimulus	   coherence	   was	   the	   proportion	   of	   tones	   in	   a	   tone-­‐burst	   sequence	  whose	   frequencies	   were	   a	   fixed	   frequency	   increment	   from	   the	   previous	   tone.	   A	  tone-­‐burst	  sequence	  in	  which	  all	  of	   the	  tone	  bursts	  were	  monotonically	   increasing	  or	  decreasing	  had	  a	  coherence	  of	  100%.	  For	  sequences	  with	  coherence	  <100%,	  we	  first	   generated	   the	   100%	   coherent	   stimulus	   and	   then	   randomly	   shuffled	   the	  temporal	   order	   of	   a	   subset	   of	   tone	  bursts.	  A	  50%	  coherent	   stimulus,	   for	   instance,	  was	   generated	   by	   randomly	   shuffling	   50%	   of	   the	   tone	   bursts.	   A	   0%	   coherent	  stimulus	  had	  100%	  of	   the	   tone	  bursts	   shuffled.	  By	  generating	   the	   stimulus	   in	   this	  manner,	  we	  could	  ensure	  that	  each	  sequence	  traversed	  a	  fixed	  frequency	  range	  for	  both	   increasing	  and	  decreasing	  stimuli.	  This	   is	   to	  reduce	  the	   likelihood	  of	  subjects	  basing	   their	   decisions	   on	   the	   frequency	   content	   of	   the	   stimulus	   instead	   of	   the	  pattern	  of	  frequency	  changes.	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Tone-­‐Sequence	  Frequency-­‐Direction	  Discrimination	  Task	  In	   the	   tone-­‐sequence	   frequency-­‐direction	   discrimination	   task	   (Figure	   3),	  subjects	  reported	  whether	  the	  frequency	  of	  the	  tone-­‐burst	  sequence	  was	  increasing	  or	   decreasing.	   Subjects	  were	   tested	   in	   three	   variants	   of	   the	   task:	   “response-­‐time”,	  “interrogation”,	   and	   “hybrid”.	   Prior	   to	   participating	   in	   the	   experiments,	   subjects	  provided	   informed	   consent.	   The	   University	   of	   Pennsylvania	   Institutional	   Review	  Board	  approved	  the	  experimental	  protocol	  and	  informed-­‐consent	  procedures.	  	  
Response-­‐time	  task	  	  We	   tested	   6	   subjects	   (5	   male,	   1	   female)	   in	   4	   weekly	   1.5	   hour	   sessions.	  Subjects	  were	   told	   to	   respond	  as	  quickly	  as	  possible,	  without	   sacrificing	  accuracy,	  after	  they	  reached	  their	  decision.	  Each	  session	  contained	  4	  blocks	  of	  trials.	  Subjects	  took	  a	  short	  break	  between	  each	  block.	  During	  each	  block,	  we	  varied,	  on	  a	  trial-­‐by-­‐trial	  basis,	  IBI	  (10,	  60,	  or	  150	  ms),	  coherence	  (0,	  10,	  25,	  50,	  or	  100%),	  and	  stimulus	  direction	  (increasing	  or	  decreasing).	  Each	  combination	  of	  these	  sequence	  properties	  was	   presented	  5	   times	  within	   a	   block,	   for	   a	   total	   of	   150	   trials	   per	   block.	   Subjects	  were	  given	  feedback	  at	  the	  end	  of	  each	  trial.	  	  
Interrogation	  Task	  	  We	   tested	   5	   subjects	   (4	  male,	   1	   female)	   in	   6	  weekly	   1.5	   hour	   sessions.	   On	  each	   trial,	   the	   stimulus	   duration	   was	   sampled	   from	   a	   truncated	   exponential	  distribution	  (λ	  =	  2000	  ms	  for	  all	  IBIs;	  upper	  and	  lower	  stimulus	  duration	  limits	  by	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IBI:	  	  10	  ms,	  [160,	  1400]	  ms;	  60	  ms,	  [360,	  3150]	  ms;	  150	  ms,	  [720,	  6300]	  ms)	  so	  that	  subjects	   could	   not	   anticipate	   the	   end	   of	   the	   stimulus.	   The	   truncation	   limits	   are	  standardized	  across	   IBI	  by	   the	  minimum	  (4)	   and	  maximum	  (35)	  number	  of	   tones	  presented.	  After	  the	  end	  of	  the	  stimulus,	  a	  response	  cue	  flashed	  on	  the	  screen,	  and	  subjects	   had	   800	   ms	   to	   respond.	   Each	   session	   contained	   four	   blocks	   of	   trials.	  Subjects	  took	  a	  short	  break	  between	  each	  block.	  During	  each	  block,	  we	  varied,	  on	  a	  trial-­‐by-­‐trial	  basis,	  IBI	  (10,	  60,	  or	  150	  ms),	  coherence	  (0,	  10,	  25,	  50,	  or	  100%),	  and	  stimulus	   direction	   increasing	   or	   decreasing).	   Each	   combination	   of	   these	   sequence	  properties	  was	  presented	  5	  times	  within	  a	  block,	  for	  a	  total	  of	  150	  trials	  per	  block.	  Subjects	  were	  given	  feedback	  at	  the	  end	  of	  each	  trial.	  	  
Hybrid	  Task	  We	  also	  tested	  5	  subjects	  (3	  male,	  2	  female)	  in	  4	  weekly	  1.25	  hour	  sessions.	  Like	  on	  the	  interrogation	  task,	  on	  each	  trial,	  stimulus	  duration	  was	  sampled	  from	  a	  truncated	   exponential	   distribution	   (λ	   =	   2000	   ms)	   so	   that	   subjects	   could	   not	  anticipate	  the	  end	  of	  the	  stimulus.	  The	  truncation	  limits	  are	  standardized	  across	  IBIs	  by	  the	  minimum	  (4)	  and	  maximum	  (35)	  number	  of	  tones	  presented.	  In	  addition	  to	  making	   a	   judgment	   regarding	   whether	   stimulus	   direction,	   subjects	   also	   reported	  whether	   they	  perceived	   the	  stimulus	  as	   “one,	   continuous	  sound”	  or	   “as	  a	  series	  of	  discrete	   sounds”.	   Subjects	   reported	   their	   responses	   during	   two	   800-­‐ms	   response	  periods,	  and	  a	  response	  cue	  indicated	  the	  response	  order.	  The	  order	  of	  the	  stimulus-­‐
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direction	   judgment	   and	   stimulus-­‐continuity	   judgments	  was	   alternated	   on	   a	   block-­‐by-­‐block	  basis.	  	  Prior	   to	  participating	   in	   the	  hybrid	  task,	  each	  subject’s	   “50%-­‐IBI	   threshold”	  and	   “coherence	   threshold”	   was	   measured	   and	   incorporated	   into	   the	   parameters	  used	  to	  generate	  the	  tone-­‐burst	  sequence.	  Each	  subject’s	  IBI	  threshold,	  defined	  to	  be	  the	  IBI	  value	  for	  which	  50%	  of	  the	  responses	  rated	  the	  stimulus	  as	  continuous,	  was	  measured	   using	   a	   1-­‐up/1-­‐down	   adaptive	   procedure.	   The	   IBI	   threshold	   was	  measured	   daily,	   before	   the	   start	   of	   each	   session.	   We	   found,	   in	   early	   pilot	  experiments,	   that	   each	   subject’s	   IBI	   threshold	   varied	   across	   days.	   We	   measured	  each	   subject’s	   coherence	   threshold	   using	   a	   2-­‐up/1-­‐down	   adaptive	   procedure.	  Threshold	  was	  defined	  to	  be	  70.7%	  correct	  performance,	  which	  corresponds	  to	  a	  d’	  of	  0.77.	  Each	  subject’s	  coherence	  threshold	  was	  calculated	  for	  tone-­‐burst	  sequences	  using	  the	  initial	  session’s	  IBI	  threshold.	  Coherence	  threshold	  was	  calculated	  prior	  to	  a	   subject’s	   participation	   in	   the	   hybrid	   task	   and	   kept	   constant	   for	   all	   subsequent	  hybrid-­‐task	  sessions.	  Each	   session	   contained	   four	   blocks	   of	   trials.	   Subjects	   took	   a	   short	   break	  between	  each	  block.	  During	  each	  block,	  we	  varied,	  on	  a	  trial-­‐by-­‐trial	  basis,	  IBI	  (50%-­‐threshold	  -­‐	  15	  ms,	  50%-­‐IBI	  threshold,	  and	  50%-­‐IBI	  threshold	  +	  15	  ms)	  and	  stimulus	  direction	   (increasing	   or	   decreasing).	   The	   sequence	   coherence	   was	   set	   to	   each	  subject’s	  coherence	  threshold.	  For	  each	  stimulus	  direction	  condition,	  the	  threshold	  IBI	   condition	   was	   repeated	   40	   times	   per	   block,	   and	   the	   two	   off-­‐threshold	   IBI	  conditions	  were	  repeated	  10	   times	  per	  block.	  The	   trials	  were	  randomly	  presented	  
  21 
within	  each	  block.	  Subjects	  were	  given	  feedback	  regarding	  whether	  they	  made	  the	  correct	  stimulus	  direction	  judgment	  at	  the	  end	  of	  each	  trial.	  	  	  
Data	  Analysis	  Each	   subject’s	   behavioral	   data	   was	   fit	   to	   a	   drift	   diffusion	  model	   (DDM)	   to	  quantify	   the	   effects	   that	   sequence	   coherence	   and	   IBI	   had	   on	   the	   decision-­‐making	  process.	  We	  computed	  psychophysical	  kernels	  for	  each	  IBI	  using	  data	  pooled	  across	  all	   of	   the	   subjects	   to	   test	   whether	   subjects	   were	   accumulating	   sensory	   evidence	  across	  time	  and	  whether	  the	  time	  course	  of	  integration	  was	  affected	  by	  IBI.	  We	  also	  tested	  whether	   subjects	   could	   use	   the	   frequency	   of	   the	   stimulus	   as	   an	   alternative	  strategy	  to	  decide	  whether	  the	  stimulus	  was	  increasing	  or	  decreasing	  in	  frequency.	  	  
Drift	  Diffusion	  Model	  The	   DDM	   relates	   a	   subject’s	   accuracy	   on	   a	   two-­‐alternative	   forced-­‐choice	  (2AFC)	   task	   to	   the	   amount	   of	   time	   that	   the	   subject	   used	   to	   reach	   their	   decision.	  Central	  to	  the	  drift	  diffusion	  model	  is	  that	  sensory	  evidence	  is	  accumulated	  through	  time	   as	   the	   decision	   variable	   (Bogacaz	   2006,	   Gold	   &	   Shadlen	   2007).	   For	   the	  response-­‐time	  task,	  a	  categorical	  decision	  is	  generated,	  according	  to	  the	  DDM,	  when	  the	   accumulated	   sensory	   evidence	   reaches	   a	   response	   threshold,	   or	   the	   decision	  boundary.	  Similarly,	  according	   to	   the	  DDM,	   for	   the	   interrogation	   task,	   the	  value	  of	  the	  accumulated	  sensory	  evidence	  is	  compared	  to	  its	  value	  at	  the	  start	  of	  the	  trial	  to	  determine	  the	  choice	  that	  is	  reported.	  Because	  of	  the	  different	  assumptions	  of	  how	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the	  decision	   is	   generated	  based	  on	   the	   accumulated	   sensory	   evidence	   for	   the	   two	  types	   of	   tasks,	   we	   used	   one	  mathematical	   formulations	   of	   the	   DDM	   to	  model	   the	  reaction-­‐time	  and	  a	  different	   formulation	  of	   the	  DDM	  for	   interrogation	  and	  hybrid	  data.	   For	  the	  response-­‐time	  data,	  the	  DDM	  (Palmer	  et	  al	  2005)	  is	  parameterized	  by	  the	  drift	  rate	  coefficient,	  two	  decision	  boundaries,	  and	  a	  non-­‐decision	  time.	  The	  drift	  rate	   coefficient	   scales	   the	   coherence	  of	   the	   stimulus	  proportionately	   to	  obtain	   the	  drift	  rate,	  which	  represents	  the	  amount	  of	  momentary	  evidence	  available	  at	  a	  given	  moment.	   The	   drift	   rate	   is	   normally	   distributed	   with	   the	   mean	   given	   by	  𝜇 = 𝑘𝐶,	  where	  k	  is	  the	  fitted	  drift	  rate	  coefficient	  and	  C	  coherence,	  and	  unit	  variance.	  As	  the	  accumulated	   sensory	   evidence	   reaches	   one	   of	   the	   two	   decision	   boundaries,	   the	  corresponding	  choice	  is	  made.	  The	  non-­‐decision	  time	  is	  the	  component	  of	  response	  time	   corresponding	   to	   motor	   preparation	   time	   and	   low-­‐level	   sensory	   processing	  latencies.	   The	   probability	   of	   the	   accumulated	   evidence	   reaching	   boundary	   A	   is	  𝑃! = 𝑒2𝜇𝐵!!𝑒2𝜇𝐵!𝑒2𝜇𝐴.	  The	  mean	  decision	  time	  for	  choice	  A,	  or	  the	  time	  from	  stimulus	  onset	  to	   the	   accumulated	   evidence	   reaching	   boundary	   A,	   is	  𝑇! = !!!! coth (𝐴 + 𝐵)𝜇 −!! coth 𝐵𝜇 .	   Similarly,	   for	   choice	   B,	   the	   mean	   decision	   time	   is	  𝑇! = !!!! coth (𝐴 +𝐵)𝜇 − !! coth 𝐴𝜇 .	  The	   response	   time	   for	  a	  given	  choice	   is	   the	   sum	  of	   the	  decision	  time	  and	  the	  non-­‐decision	  time.	  	  For	  the	  interrogation	  and	  hybrid	  tasks,	  the	  DDM	  is	  parameterized	  by	  the	  drift	  rate	  and	  lapse	  rate	  (Eckhoff	  et	  al	  2005).	  Like	  the	  reaction	  time	  model,	  the	  drift	  rate	  
  23 
is	  given	  by	  𝜇 = 𝑘𝐶,	  where	  k	  is	  the	  fitted	  drift	  rate	  coefficient	  and	  C	  coherence.	  For	  a	  given	   listening	   duration,	   the	   probability	   of	   choosing	   choice	   A	   is	   given	   by	  𝑃! 𝑡 =
!!! !!!! !"#( !!!)	  All	   model	   fits	   were	   based	   on	  maximizing	   the	   likelihood	   of	   the	   parameters	  given	   the	   data.	   Subjects’	   choices	   were	   modeled	   as	   binomial	   errors	   and	   mean	  response	   times	  were	  modeled	   as	   Gaussian	   errors.	   The	  models	  were	   implemented	  and	   fit	   using	  Matlab.	   To	   avoid	   local	  maxima,	   the	   fitting	   procedure	  was	   initialized	  with	  multiple	  random	  starting	  points	  in	  the	  parameter	  space.	  Parameter	  confidence	  intervals	  were	  estimated	  using	  a	  bootstrap	  method.	  
	  
Simulated	  DDM	  We	   examined	   how	   decision	   boundary	   dynamics	   of	   the	  DDM	   affects	   choice,	  response-­‐times,	   and	   the	   psychophysical	   kernels	   by	   simulating	   the	   DDM	   with	  different	   types	   of	   decision	   boundary	   dynamics.	   We	   simulated	   the	   temporal	  evolution	   of	   the	   accumulated	   sensory	   evidence	   on	   each	   trial	   by	   numerically	  integrating	   the	   stochastic	   differential	   equation:	   dX	   =	   kC*dt	   +	   dW.	   Here,	   k	  corresponds	   to	   the	   drift	   rate	   coefficient,	   C	   is	   the	   coherence	   of	   the	   trial	   being	  simulated,	  dW	  is	  a	  standard	  Gaussian	  process	  representing	  the	  noise	  in	  the	  sensory	  evidence,	   when	   combined,	   represents	   dX,	   the	   momentary	   sensory	   evidence.	   For	  each	   coherence	   and	   IBI	   condition,	   we	   simulated	   5000	   trials	   for	   5000	  ms	   using	   a	  variable	   simulation	   time	   step	   that	   varied	   according	   to	   the	   IBI	   in	   order	   to	   run	   the	  simulations	  in	  signal	  time.	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We	   computed	   the	   simulated	   choices	   and	   response	   times	   by	   comparing	   the	  accumulated	   sensory	   evidence,	   X,	   on	   each	   trial	   to	   a	   decision	  boundary.	  We	   tested	  two	  types	  of	  boundaries,	  one	  that	  did	  not	  vary	  in	  time	  (“fixed	  bound”)	  and	  one	  that	  decreased	   linearly	   to	   zero	   as	   the	   trial	   progressed	   (“collapsing	   bound”).	   The	   fixed	  boundary	   had	   one	   parameter,	   the	   bound	   height.	   The	   collapsing	   bound	   had	   two	  parameters,	  the	  bound	  height	  at	  the	  start	  of	  the	  trial	  and	  the	  time	  (in	  elapsed	  time,	  not	  signal	  time)	  when	  the	  bound	  reached	  zero.	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  type	  of	  bound,	  we	  also	  tested	  two	  different	  relationships	  between	  the	  boundary	  and	  IBI.	  One	  way	  only	  had	  one	  set	  of	  boundary	  parameters	   for	  all	   IBI	   conditions,	  whereas	   the	  other	  way	  had	  one	  set	  of	  boundary	  parameters	   for	  each	   IBI	  condition.	   In	  summary	  we	  tested	  whether	  a	  fixed	  bound	  or	  a	  collapsing	  bound	  with	  one	  set	  of	  boundary	  parameters	  for	  all	  IBIs	  or	  with	  a	  set	  of	  boundary	  parameters	  for	  each	  IBI.	  To	  find	  the	  best	  fitting	  parameters,	  we	  maximized	  the	  likelihood	  of	  the	  model	  given	   the	   parameters	   using,	   as	   before,	   a	   binomial	   likelihood	   for	   choices	   and	   a	  Gaussian	   likelihood	   for	   the	   mean	   response	   times.	   We	   used	   a	   derivative-­‐free	  optimization	  method	   (fminsearch	   in	  Matlab)	   to	   compute	   the	  maximum	   likelihood	  fits.	   To	   compare	   the	   different	   models	   we	   computed	   the	   Bayesian	   information	  criterion	  (BIC	  =	  -­‐2*log(F(x|θ))	  –	  p*log(n);	  n:	  number	  of	  observations;	  p:	  number	  of	  parameters;	  θ:	  model	  parameters)	  for	  each	  of	  the	  tested	  models.	  to	  account	  for	  the	  differences	  in	  the	  number	  of	  parameters	  for	  the	  models	  we	  tested.	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To	  generate	  the	  kernel	  predictions	  for	  the	  best	  fitting	  model,	  the	  simulation	  paths	   for	   the	   0%	   coherence	   condition	   were	   averaged	   across	   trials	   separated	   by	  choice	  and	  then	  averaged	  across	  time.	  	  
Psychophysical	  kernel	  The	  psychophysical	   kernels	  were	   estimated	  using	   a	   logistic	   regression	   that	  related	  the	  stimulus	  to	  the	  subject’s	  choice	  on	  a	  particular	  trial:	  (Equation:	  logit(y)	  ~	  b0	   +	   b1*x1	   +	   …+	   bn*xn	   +	   epsilon,	   epsilon	   ~	   N(0,1)).	   The	   covariates	   (x1,…,xn)	  represented	  the	  difference	  in	  frequency	  between	  consecutive	  tones	  for	  a	  tone-­‐burst	  sequence	   presented	   on	   each	   trial.	   The	   estimated	   regression	   coefficients	   (b1,…,bn)	  represented	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  a	  subject	  weighed,	  at	  a	  given	  moment	  in	  time,	  the	  difference	   in	   frequency	  of	  a	   tone	  burst	  pair	   to	   form	  a	   judgment.	  We	  pooled	  choice	  data	   and	   stimuli	   across	   all	   6	   subjects	   in	   the	   response-­‐time	   task	   to	   compute	   the	  psychophysical	  kernels	   for	  each	  of	   the	   IBI	  conditions.	  The	  kernels	  were	  computed	  using	   only	   0%	   coherence	   trials	   and	   not	   on	   any	   coherent	   patterns	   of	   frequency	  changes	  in	  the	  stimulus.	  A	   permutation	   test	   was	   used	   to	   test	   whether	   the	   observed	   kernels	   were	  significantly	   different	   from	   a	   null	   kernel,	   assuming	   that	   there	   was	   no	   systematic	  relationship	  between	  the	  stimulus	  and	  subject’s	  response.	  We	  generated	  N	  synthetic,	  test	   datasets	   by	   randomly	   permuting	   the	   reported	   choice	   on	   each	   trial	   and	   the	  associated	   stimuli.	   Each	   synthetic	   dataset	   was	   used	   to	   calculate	   a	   kernel.	   The	  collection	  N	   kernels	   for	   each	   IBI	   approximated	   the	   distribution	   of	   kernel	  weights	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assuming	  that	  the	  null	  hypothesis	  was	  true.	  The	  kernel	  weights	  calculated	  based	  on	  the	  actual,	  observed	  data	  was	  compared	  to	  the	  null	  distribution	  of	  kernel	  weights	  to	  compute	  a	  p-­‐value.	  The	  kernel	  widths	  were	  calculated	  for	  each	  kernel	  at	  its	  half-­‐maximum	  value.	  Bootstrap	   confidence	   intervals	   were	   calculated	   by	   resampling	   trials	   within	   each	  subject’s	  dataset	  with	   replacement	  and	   then	  pooling	  across	   subjects	   to	  generate	  a	  pooled	   bootstrap	   dataset.	   Kernels	   were	   estimated	   using	   these	   pooled	   bootstrap	  dataset	  and	  this	  procedure	  was	  repeated	  2000	  times.	  Kernel	  widths	  were	  estimated	  for	  each	  of	  the	  bootstrap	  kernels	  and	  confidence	  intervals	  were	  calculated	  based	  on	  the	  2.5%	  and	  97.5%	  percentiles	  of	  the	  bootstrap	  kernel	  width	  distribution.	  	  
Absolute	  Frequency	  Decision	  Model	  We	  tested	  whether	  subjects	  used	  an	  alternative	  strategy	  to	  solve	  the	  task	  by	  comparing	  the	  absolute	  frequency	  of	  the	  stimulus	  to	  an	  optimal	  criterion	  based	  on	  an	   ideal	  observer.	  The	   tone	   frequencies	   immediately	  preceding	  when	   the	  decision	  was	   reported	   was	   sorted	   by	   the	   reported	   decision	   outcome.	   The	   frequency	  distribution	  corresponding	  to	  “increasing	   frequency”	  choices	  was	  compared	  to	   the	  frequency	  distribution	  corresponding	  to	  “decreasing	  frequency”	  choices	  by	  an	  ROC	  analysis	   for	  all	   trials	  of	   a	  given	   IBI.	  The	   frequency	   threshold	   corresponding	   to	   the	  point	   on	   the	   operating	   curve	   that	   minimizes	   false	   positives	   and	   maximizes	   true	  positives	   is	   used	   to	   calculate	   is	   used	   as	   the	   decision	   rule	   to	   make	   a	   judgment	  whether	   the	   stimulus	   presented	   on	   a	   given	   trial	   was	   increasing	   or	   decreasing	   in	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frequency.	   In	   addition	   to	   the	   tone	   immediately	   preceding	   the	   moment	   that	   the	  decision	  was	   reported,	  we	   tested	  up	   to	  9-­‐tones	  back	   from	  when	   the	  decision	  was	  made.	  We	  also	  tested	  this	  strategy	  using	  the	  average	  frequency	  of	  up	  to	  9-­‐tones	  back	  from	  when	  the	  decision	  was	  reported.	  	  
Results	  
We	   tested	   how	   the	   time-­‐course	   of	   sensory	   evidence	   integration	   in	   an	  auditory	   task	  was	  affected	  by	  a	   temporal	  manipulation	   that	  affected	   the	  perceived	  grouping	  of	  the	  stimulus.	  We	  used	  a	  two-­‐alternative	  forced-­‐choice	  task	  that	  required	  subjects	   to	   report	   whether	   frequency	   direction	   of	   a	   tone	   burst	   sequence	   was	  increasing	   or	   decreasing	   (Figure	   1A).	   To	   control	   task	   difficulty,	   we	   manipulated	  stimulus	   “coherence,”	   corresponding	   to	   the	   fraction	   of	   tones	   that	   increased	   or	  decreased	  systematically	  in	  frequency	  (Figure	  1A-­‐C).	  To	  manipulate	  the	  sequential-­‐grouping	   cues	   of	   the	   stimulus,	  we	   altered	   the	   stimulus	   presentation	   rate	   (i.e.,	   the	  inter-­‐tone-­‐burst-­‐interval	   [IBI],	   Figure	   1D).	   As	   detailed	   below,	   we	   used	   three	  versions	  (Figure	  3)	  of	  the	  decision	  task	  to	  test	  how	  perceptual	  grouping	  affects	  the	  time-­‐course	  of	  the	  decision:	  1)	  a	  “response-­‐time”	  task	  where	  subjects	  could	  respond	  at	  any	   time	  after	   the	  beginning	  of	   the	  stimulus	  presentation,	  2)	  an	   “interrogation”	  task	  where	  the	  stimulus	  duration	  was	  experimentally	  varied	  on	  each	  trial,	  and	  3)	  a	  “hybrid”	  task	  where	   subjects	   reported	  both	   the	   continuity	  of	   the	   stimulus	  and	   the	  stimulus	  direction.	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Response-­‐time	  Task	  	  The	  response-­‐time	  task	  tested	  whether	  subjects’	  accuracy	  and	  reaction	  time	  varied	  with	  task	  difficulty	  (coherence)	  and	  stimulus	  presentation	  rate	  (IBI).	  Figure	  4A-­‐B	   shows	   the	   behavioral	   data	   collected	   from	   the	   response-­‐time	   task	   for	   one	  subject.	  As	  can	  be	  seen,	  this	  subject	  was	  more	  accurate	  and	  responded	  faster	  when	  the	  decisions	  were	   easy	   (i.e.,	   ±100%	  coherence	   trials)	   than	   for	  difficult	   trials	   (i.e.,	  0%	  coherences	  trials).	  We	   quantified	   the	   effect	   of	   coherence	   and	   IBI	   on	   the	   decision	   process	   by	  fitting	  the	  choice	  and	  response-­‐time	  data	  for	  each	  subject	  to	  a	  drift	  diffusion	  model	  (DDM).	   (The	  solid	  curves	   in	  Figure	  4A,	  B	  represent	  best-­‐fitting	  DDM	  psychometric	  and	  chronometric	  functions.)	  The	  best-­‐fitting	  DDM	  parameters	  for	  the	  6	  subjects	  are	  shown	   in	   Figure	   5A-­‐C.	   IBI	   significantly	   modulated	   the	   fit	   boundary	   heights	   (or	  response	   criteria)	   (F(2,10)	   =	   53.73,	   p	   <	   0.05)	   and	   the	   drift	   rates	   (rate	   of	   sensory	  evidence	  accumulation)	  (F(2,10)	  =	  239.6,	  p	  <	  0.05).	  The	  nondecision	  times	  were	  also	  significantly	  affected	  by	  IBI	  (F(2,10)	  =	  6.336,	  p<0.05).	  The	   differences	   in	   the	   fitted	   drift	   rates	   and	   boundary	   heights	   across	   IBIs	  could	  be	  due	  to	  IBI	  affecting	  the	  accumulation	  rate,	  the	  response	  criteria	  for	  making	  a	   response,	   or	   both.	   The	   stimulus	   presentation	   rate	   has	   a	   clear	   effect	   on	   the	  accumulation	   rate	   of	   sensory	   evidence.	   The	   faster	   the	   stimulus	   is	   played	  (equivalently	   the	  shorter	   the	   IBI),	   then	   the	   faster	   the	   information	  will	  accumulate.	  Similarly,	   if	   subjects	  made	   their	   decisions	   by	   integrating	   sensory	   evidence	   over	   a	  fixed	   time	   window,	   the	   faster	   the	   presentation	   rate,	   the	   more	   information	   will	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accumulate	  over	  this	  period	  and	  thus	  have	  higher	  corresponding	  bound	  heights.	  In	  order	   to	   disambiguate	   the	   effects	   of	   IBI	   on	   the	   decision-­‐making	   computation	   that	  cannot	  be	  explained	  by	  the	  differences	  in	  the	  presentation	  rate	  across	  IBIs,	  we	  fitted	  the	   DDM	   to	   transformed	   chronometric	   data	   to	   control	   for	   the	   presentation	   rate	  differences.	  We	  transformed	  RTs	  for	  each	  trial	  to	  “signal	  response	  time,”	  (signal	  RT)	  by	   number	   of	   elapsed	   tones	   from	   the	   start	   of	   the	   stimulus	   presentation	   to	   the	  subject’s	  response	  multiplied	  by	  the	  tone	  duration	  (30	  ms).	  If	   there	   was	   no	   difference	   in	   signal	   RTs	   across	   IBI	   conditions,	   this	   would	  suggest	  that	  subjects	  based	  their	  decisions	  solely	  on	  accumulating	  a	  fixed	  number	  of	  tones	  independent	  of	  IBI	  and	  therefore	  the	  accumulation	  rate	  would	  vary	  with	  the	  stimulus	   presentation	   rate	   and	   the	   bound	   height	   would	   decrease	   at	   long	   IBIs,	  corresponding	   to	   a	   fixed	   signal-­‐time	   integration	  window.	  However,	  we	   found	   that	  signal	  RTs	  (Figure	  4C)	  for	  short	  IBI	  trials	  in	  a	  representative	  subject	  was	  increased	  across	   all	   coherences	   compared	   to	   long	   IBI	   trials.	   This	   was	   observed	   for	   all	   6	  subjects.	   This	   suggests	   that	   subjects	   are	   not	   merely	   integrating	   each	   tone	   to	   a	  common	  bound	  so	  to	  quantify	  this,	  we	  fitted	  the	  signal	  RT	  data	  to	  the	  DDM.	  	  Indeed,	  when	  the	  DDM	  was	  fit	  to	  the	  signal	  RT	  data	  (See	  Figure	  4C	  for	  DDM	  fit	  to	  example	  subject,	  Figure	  5D-­‐F	  for	  fitted	  parameters	  by	  subject),	  we	  found	  that	  the	  accumulation	  rate	  was	  not	  modulated	  (F(2,10)	  =	  3.122,	  p	  >	  0.05)	  by	  IBI,	  whereas	  response	  thresholds	  (decision	  criteria	   for	   the	  accumulated	   information)	  decreased	  reliably	   (F(2,10)	   =	   306.2,	   p	   <	   0.05)	   with	   increasing	   IBI.	   The	   nondecision	   times	  increased	   as	   IBI	   increased	   (F(2,10)	   =	   21.15,	   p	   <	   0.05).	   This	   suggests	   that	   after	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controlling	   for	   the	   presentation	   rate	   of	   the	   stimulus,	   the	   quality	   or	   the	   signal-­‐to-­‐noise	   of	   the	   sensory	   evidence	   did	   not	   change	   as	   the	   IBI	   varied	   and	   that	   subjects	  were	   actually	   varying	   the	   amount	   of	   information	   they	   accumulated	   before	  responding.	  We	  wanted	  to	  then	  examine	  how	  subjects	  actually	  converted	  the	  information	  in	  the	  stimulus	  into	  the	  decision	  and	  whether	  we	  can	  validate	  our	  previous	  finding	  in	  a	  model-­‐independent	  manner.	  First	  we	  tested	  whether	  subjects	  could	  base	  their	  judgments	  on	   the	  absolute	   frequency	  of	   the	   stimulus.	  We	   found	   that	   this	   absolute	  frequency-­‐based	  strategy	  is	  incompatible	  with	  the	  observed	  performance	  (Figure	  6).	  	  To	   test	   the	   effect	   of	   IBI	   on	   the	   time	   course	   of	   the	   sensory	   evidence	  contributing	   to	   the	   decision,	   we	   computed	   the	   reverse	   correlation-­‐based	  psychophysical	  kernels	  based	  on	  data	  pooled	  across	  the	  6	  subjects	  who	  participated	  in	   the	   response-­‐time	   task.	   The	   psychophysical	   kernel	   is	   computed	   based	   on	   the	  principles	   of	   signal-­‐detection	   theory	   (Murray	   2011;	   Knoblauch	   &	   Maloney	   2008)	  and,	  here,	   it	  relates	  the	  temporal	  dynamics	  of	   the	  tone	  frequencies	  presented	  on	  a	  given	  trial	  to	  the	  subjects’	  choice.	  This	  analysis	  is	  model	  free	  in	  that	  it	  does	  not	  make	  any	  particular	  assumptions	  on	  the	  strategy	  that	  subjects	  use	  to	  convert	  the	  stimulus	  to	  the	  decision.	  These	  kernels	  show	  the	  relative	  weighting	  of	  each	  sample	  of	  sensory	  evidence	   over	   time	   that	   contribute	   to	   the	  decision.	   In	   other	  words,	   regions	   of	   the	  kernel	   closest	   in	   value	   to	   0	   represent	   the	   times	   when	   the	   sensory	   evidence	  contributed	  very	  little	  towards	  making	  the	  decision,	  and,	  similarly,	  the	  regions	  of	  the	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kernel	  with	  relatively	   large	  values	  represent	   the	   times	  when	  the	  sensory	  evidence	  had	  a	  large	  contribution	  towards	  making	  the	  decision.	  	  Consistent	   with	   our	   alternative	   absolute	   frequency	   strategy	   analysis,	   we	  found	  that	  kernels	  calculated	  using	  the	  tone	  frequencies	  alone	  were	  not	  significantly	  different	   from	  zero	  (not	  shown).	  By	  calculating	   the	  kernels	  using	   the	  difference	   in	  frequency	   between	   adjacent	   tones,	   we	   found	   that	   subjects	   were	   using	   frequency	  differences	  as	  sensory	  evidence	  in	  this	  task.	  We	  found	  that	  the	  kernels	  calculated	  for	  each	  IBI	  using	  the	  frequency	  differences	  as	  the	  sensory	  evidence	  showed	  significant	  non-­‐zero	   weights	   across	   multiple,	   consecutive	   samples	   of	   sensory	   evidence,	  consistent	   with	   the	   accumulation	   of	   sensory	   evidence.	   We	   calculated	   the	   kernels	  both	   by	   aligning	   the	   data	   to	   the	   start	   of	   each	   trial	   (Figure	   7A,C),	   as	   well	   as	   by	  aligning	   the	   data	   to	   when	   the	   judgments	   were	   reported,	   as	   seen	   in	   the	   choice-­‐aligned	  kernels	  (Figure	  7B,D).	  By	  calculating	  the	  kernels	  in	  this	  way,	  we	  can	  examine	  the	  kernel	  dynamics	  at	   the	  start	  of	  each	  trial,	  however,	  as	   the	  trial	  progresses,	   the	  kernels	   become	   less	   informative	   because	   of	   fewer	   number	   of	   trials	   with	   long	  response	  times.	  We	  use	  the	  choice-­‐aligned	  kernels	  to	  examine	  the	  kernel	  dynamics	  towards	  the	  end	  of	  the	  trial,	  when	  presumably	  subjects	  are	  actively	  deliberating	  and	  processing	  the	  sensory	  evidence	  to	  make	  their	  decision.	  Overall,	  our	  results	  suggest	  that	  the	  non-­‐zero	  weights	  seen	  in	  both	  the	  start-­‐aligned	  and	  choice-­‐aligned	  kernels	  show	   that	   subjects	   accumulate	   sensory	   evidence	   contained	   in	   the	   stimulus	  sequentially,	  through	  time,	  to	  inform	  their	  decisions.	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While	  the	  kernels	  plotted	  in	  terms	  of	  elapsed	  time	  and	  the	  kernels	  plotted	  in	  terms	  of	  signal-­‐time	  represent	  the	  same	  information,	  the	  different	  time	  scales	  allow	  us	   to	   compare	   the	  kernel	  dynamics	   in	   terms	  of	   the	  number	  of	   samples	  of	   sensory	  evidence	  with	  the	  dynamics	  in	  terms	  of	  elapsed	  time.	  By	  comparing	  the	  dynamics	  of	  the	   kernel	   across	   the	   different	   time	   units,	   we	   can	   examine	   how	   subjects	   are	  deliberating	  over	  the	  incoming	  sensory	  evidence	  across	  IBI	  conditions.	  For	  example,	  the	  time	  to	  reach	  the	  peak	  of	  the	  kernel,	  when	  expressed	  as	  elapsed	  time	  seem	  to	  be	  similar	   overall	   (Figure	   7C-­‐D),	  whereas	  when	   expressed	   as	   the	   number	   of	   elapsed	  samples	  of	  sensory	  evidence,	   there	   is	  a	  dramatic	  reduction	   in	   the	  time-­‐to-­‐peak	   for	  long	  IBI	  compared	  to	  short	  IBI	  (Figure	  7A-­‐B).	  We	   quantified	   whether	   IBI	   had	   an	   effect	   on	   the	   shape	   of	   the	   kernels	   by	  calculating	  the	  width	  of	  the	  choice-­‐aligned	  kernels	  at	  half	  of	  its	  peak	  value	  for	  each	  IBI.	  We	  found	  that	  the	  kernel	  widths	  estimated	  in	  elapsed	  time	  units	  were	  840	  ms	  for	  the	  10	  ms	  IBI	  (Bootstrap	  95%	  CI:	  [700	  ms,	  880	  ms]),	  1080	  ms	  for	  the	  60	  ms	  IBI	  ([900	  ms,	  1350	  ms]),	   and	  1440	  ms	   for	   the	  150	  ms	   IBI	   ([1260	  ms,	  1620	  ms]).	  The	  kernel	   widths	   across	   IBI	   suggest	   that	   subjects	   integrate	   the	   incoming	   sensory	  evidence	  over	  a	   temporal	   integration	  window	  that	  varies	  as	  a	   function	  of	  stimulus	  presentation	  rate/IBI.	  	  
	  
Interrogation	  Task	  Since	   the	   data	   collected	   for	   the	   response	   time	   task	   depended	   on	   each	  subject’s	   particular	   speed-­‐accuracy	   tradeoff,	   which	   we	   can	   not	   directly	   measure,	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there	  is	  still	  the	  possibility	  that	  the	  output	  of	  the	  DDM	  fitting	  procedure	  could	  result	  in	  the	  trade-­‐off	  of	  drift	  rates	  with	  the	  bound	  heights	  across	  IBI	  (Ratcliff	  2002).	  This	  could	  give	  us	  results	   that	  do	  not	  accurately	  reflect	   the	  differences	   in	   the	  drift	   rate	  due	   to	   legitimate	   IBI-­‐related	   effects.	   To	   circumvent	   this	   possibility,	   we	   tested	  subjects	   using	   the	   interrogation	   task,	   which	   allowed	   us	   to	   test	   directly	   the	  relationship	  between	   IBI	  and	  drift	   rate	  by	  experimentally	   controlling	   the	   listening	  duration	  of	  the	  stimulus	  and	  monitoring	  subjects’	  performance.	  In	  the	  interrogation	  task,	  subjects	  based	  their	  decisions	  on	  the	  sensory	  evidence	  that	  was	  provided.	  We	  used	   a	   two-­‐alternative	   forced	   choice	   “interrogation”	   task	   (Figure	   3B)	   where	   we	  experimentally	   manipulated	   the	   listening	   duration	   across	   trials.	   The	   stimulus	  durations	  in	  this	  task	  were	  set	  randomly	  at	  the	  start	  of	  each	  trial	  and	  subjects	  could	  respond	  only	  after	  the	  end	  of	  the	  stimulus	  presentation.	  	  We	   found	   that,	   for	   the	   interrogation	   task,	   subjects	   improved	   their	  performance	  as	  listening	  durations	  increased	  (Figure	  8A-­‐C).	  We	  fit	  the	  DDM	  to	  the	  time-­‐dependent	   psychometric	   data,	   converted	   into	   signal	   time	   units,	   and	   found	  (Figure	   8D)	   that	   subjects	   integrated	   the	   available	   sensory	   evidence	   to	   form	   their	  judgments	   and	   that	   IBI	   had	   no	   effect	   on	   the	   rate	   at	   which	   sensory	   evidence	   is	  integrated.	  The	  95%	  confidence	  intervals	  for	  the	  drift	  rates	  were	  overlapping	  for	  the	  IBIs.	   These	   results	   provide	   further	   evidence	   that	   IBI	   had	   no	   effect	   on	   the	  accumulation	   rate	  of	   sensory	   evidence,	   despite	   that	   it	   can	  have	   a	   crucial	   effect	   on	  whether	  subjects	  perceive	  the	  stimulus	  as	  a	  continuous	  sound	  or	  as	  a	  discrete	  series	  of	  tone	  bursts.	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Hybrid	  Task	  In	   a	   third	   experiment	   (the	   “hybrid”	   task,	   Figure	  3C),	  we	  directly	   addressed	  whether	  perceptual	  grouping	  had	  an	  effect	  on	  the	  listener’s	  decisions.	  At	  the	  start	  of	  each	  session	  of	  the	  hybrid-­‐task	  we	  determined	  the	  IBI	  for	  each	  subject	  that	  elicited	  equal	   numbers	   of	   grouped	   and	   discrete	   judgments.	  We	   adapted	   the	   interrogation	  task	  by	  adding	  a	  second	  response	  interval	  for	  subjects	  to	  report	  whether	  they	  heard	  the	  tone-­‐burst	  sequence	  as	  a	  single,	  grouped	  sound	  or	  as	  a	  series	  of	  discrete	  sounds.	  Figure	  9A	  shows	  the	  choice	  data	  pooled	  across	  subjects	  separated	  by	  the	  reported	  percept	  (“grouped”	  versus	  “discrete”).	  We	  fit	  the	  DDM	  to	  the	  data	  and	  we	  found	  that	  the	   95%	   confidence	   intervals	   of	   the	   drift	   rates	   for	   continuous	   versus	   the	   discrete	  trials	  were	  overlapping	  (Figure	  9B).	  This	  suggests	   that	   the	  same	  physical	  stimulus	  can	  elicit	  ambiguous	  (on	  a	  trial-­‐by-­‐trial)	  basis	  perceptual	  report,	  and	  that	  the	  rate	  of	  accumulation	   is	   indistinguishable,	   regardless	  of	  whether	   the	   stimulus	   is	  perceived	  as	  a	  continuous	  sound	  or	  as	  a	  series	  of	  discrete	  sounds.	  	  
Discussion	  We	   examined	   the	   role	   of	   grouping	   on	   auditory	   perceptual	   judgments	   by	  asking	  whether	  time	  gaps	  (i.e.,	  the	  IBI)	  in	  a	  stimulus	  sequence,	  which	  can	  affect	  the	  perceptual	   grouping	   of	   the	   stimulus,	   can	   also	   affect	   how	   sensory	   evidence	   is	  converted	  into	  a	  perceptual	  decision.	  We	  used	  a	  novel	  auditory-­‐discrimination	  task	  that	  required	  human	  subjects	  to	  report	  whether	  a	  stochastic	  auditory	  stimulus	  was	  increasing	   or	   decreasing	   in	   frequency.	   We	   found	   that	   their	   performance	   was	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consistent	   with	   an	   accumulate-­‐to-­‐bound	   model,	   in	   which	   incoming	   auditory	  evidence	  was	  accumulated	  over	  time	  until	  reaching	  a	  fixed	  criterion	  that	  determined	  choice	   and	   RT.	   We	   manipulated	   the	   IBI	   of	   the	   stimulus	   and	   found	   that	   as	   IBI	  increased,	   the	   decision	   criterion	   decreased,	   thereby	   affecting	   the	   speed-­‐accuracy	  trade-­‐off.	  However,	  the	  accumulation	  rate	  of	  sensory	  evidence,	  or	  the	  drift	  rate,	  was	  independent	  of	  both	  IBI	  and	  how	  subjects	  perceived	  the	  grouping	  of	  the	  stimulus.	  	  Perceptual	   grouping	   can	   affect	   perceptual	   judgments	   under	   certain	  conditions	   (Micheyl	  &	  Oxenham	  2010,	  Thompson	   et	   al	   2011,	  Borchert	   et	   al	   2011,	  Roberts	   et	   al	   2002,	   Bey	  &	  McAdams	  2002).	   For	   example,	   judgments	   about	   timing	  differences	   are	   more	   accurate	   if	   the	   comparison	   is	   made	   within	   a	   stream	   than	  comparisons	  between	  streams	  (Roberts	  et	  al	  2002).	  In	  contrast,	  in	  other	  situations,	  the	   grouping	   of	   stimuli	   into	   different	   streams	   can	   facilitate	   the	   identification	   of	   a	  tone	  sequence	  (Bey	  &	  McAdams	  2002).	  However,	  because	  of	  the	  task-­‐	  and	  stimulus	  dependence	   of	   these	   effects,	   the	  mechanisms	   that	  may	   have	   contributed	   to	   these	  effects	  are	  not	  clear.	  Our	  goal	  was	  to	  devise	  a	  stimulus	  and	  a	  task	  that	  allowed	  us	  to	  vary	   the	   temporal	   structure	   of	   the	   stimulus	   to	   affect	   how	   it	   was	   perceptually	  grouped	  by	  the	   listener	  as	  well	  as	  requiring	  the	  temporal	  accumulation	  of	  sensory	  evidence	   to	   solve	   the	   task.	  As	   sequential	   grouping	   is	   affected	  by	   the	   timing	  of	   the	  tones	   of	   the	   stimulus,	   we	   expected	   that	   decreasing	   the	   IBI,	   which	   would	  correspondingly	  increase	  the	  presentation	  rate	  of	  the	  tones	  of	  our	  stimulus,	  would	  also	   affect	   increase	   the	   rate	   of	   sensory	   evidence	   accumulation.	  We	   also	   expected	  that	  perceptual	  grouping	  effects	   resulting	   from	  the	   IBI	  manipulation	  could	   further	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facilitate	  the	  processing	  of	   the	  sensory	  evidence	  and	  therefore	   increase	  the	  rate	  of	  sensory	   evidence	   accumulation.	   Whereas	   we	   found	   that	   varying	   the	   IBI	   of	   the	  stimulus	  changed	  how	  the	  stimulus	  was	  perceived	  (see	  Figure	  2),	   the	  mechanisms	  that	   account	   for	   the	   differences	   in	   performance	   on	   the	   frequency-­‐change	  discrimination	   task	   was	   independent	   of	   both	   the	   perceptual	   organization	   of	   the	  stimulus	  and	   the	   timing	  of	   the	  stimulus.	   In	   the	   following	  sections	  we	  discuss	   first,	  the	   interpretation	   of	   our	   data;	   second,	   how	  our	   results	   suggest	   that	   subjects	   vary	  their	   speed-­‐accuracy-­‐tradeoff	   depending	   on	   the	   IBI;	   and	   third,	   why	   was	   the	  accumulation	  of	  sensory	  evidence	  invariant	  to	  IBI	  or	  the	  perceptual	  grouping	  of	  the	  stimulus.	  
Discussion	  of	  IBI	  and	  Grouping	  Effects	  on	  the	  Accumulation	  of	  Sensory	  
Evidence	  Our	   finding	   that	   both	   IBI	   and	   grouping	   do	   not	   affect	   the	   accumulation	   of	  sensory	   evidence	   is	   based	   on	   several	   lines	   of	   evidence.	   First,	   our	   analysis	   of	   the	  response	  time	  data	  addresses	  the	  facile	  explanation	  that	  by	  decreasing	  the	  IBI,	  the	  sensory	  evidence	  accumulation	  rate	  would	  naturally	  increase	  and	  could	  explain	  the	  decrease	   in	   RT	   for	   shorter	   IBI.	   We	   controlled	   for	   any	   presentation-­‐rate	   related	  effects	  by	  using	  signal	  RT	  or	  signal	   time,	  which	  measures	  the	   listening	  duration	   in	  terms	  of	  the	  total	  duration	  of	  the	  tones	  presented	  but	  does	  not	  include	  the	  	  the	  silent	  time	  between	  the	  tone	  bursts.	  By	  controlling	  for	  the	  presentation	  rate,	  we	  found	  that	  there	  was	  no	  significant	  difference	  in	  the	  drift	  rates	  across	  IBI	  for	  the	  response-­‐time	  task.	  	  Second,	  subjects	  effectively	  controlled	  the	  listening	  duration	  in	  the	  response-­‐
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time	   task	   by	   arbitrarily	   adjusting	   their	   speed-­‐accuracy	   trade-­‐off	   strategy,	   which	  cannot	   be	   directly	   measured.	   Because	   of	   the	   lack	   of	   explicit	   control	   over	   each	  subject’s	   speed-­‐accuracy	   tradeoffs,	   the	   output	   of	   the	  DDM	   fitting	   procedure	   could	  result	  in	  the	  trade-­‐off	  of	  drift	  rates	  with	  the	  bound	  heights	  across	  IBI	  (Ratcliff	  2002).	  This	   trade-­‐off	   between	  model	   drift	   rates	   and	   bound	   heights	   could	   give	   us	   results	  that	  do	  not	  accurately	  reflect	  the	  differences	  in	  the	  drift	  rate	  due	  to	  legitimate	  IBI-­‐related	   effects.	   To	   circumvent	   this	   possibility,	   we	   tested	   subjects	   using	   the	  interrogation	   task,	  which	   allowed	   us	   to	   test	   directly	   the	   relationship	   between	   IBI	  and	  drift	   rate	   by	   experimentally	   controlling	   the	   listening	  duration	   of	   the	   stimulus	  and	   monitoring	   subjects’	   performance.	   In	   the	   interrogation	   task,	   subjects	   based	  their	  decisions	  on	  the	  sensory	  evidence	  that	  was	  provided,	  and	  we	  found	  that	  across	  IBI,	   there	   was	   also	   no	   difference	   in	   the	   drift	   rate,	   after	   controlling	   for	   the	  presentation	   rate,	   consistent	  with	  our	   initial	   findings	  using	   the	  RT	   task.	  Third,	  we	  wanted	   to	   test	  whether	   grouping	  per	  se	  had	  an	   effect	   on	   the	  perceptual	   judgment	  that	   could	   be	   explained	   by	   differences	   in	   IBI.	   This	   was	   tested	   directly	   with	   the	  hybrid	  task.	  In	  this	  task,	  we	  compared	  the	  drift	  rate	  for	  decisions	  that,	  for	  the	  same	  IBI	   stimuli,	   differed	   by	   how	   subjects’	   perceived	   the	   stimulus.	   At	   the	   start	   of	   each	  session	   of	   the	   hybrid-­‐task,	   to	   aid	   our	   grouping-­‐based	   comparison,	  we	  determined	  the	   IBI	   for	   each	   subject	   that	   elicited	   equal	   numbers	   of	   grouped	   and	   discrete	  judgments.	   Again,	   subjects	   did	   not	   differ	   in	   the	   rate	   of	   sensory	   evidence	  accumulation,	  regardless	  of	  how	  they	  perceived	  the	  stimulus.	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We	  note	  that	  there	  are	  a	  couple	  of	  limitations	  to	  our	  overall	  approach.	  First,	  the	  measure	  we	  used	   to	  quantify	   the	   relationship	  between	   IBI	   and	   the	  perceptual	  organization	  of	  the	  stimulus	  has	  been	  criticized	  for	  its	  dependency	  on	  the	  subjects’	  subjective	   report	   (Thompson	   et	   al	   2010).	   By	   asking	  whether	   subjects	   perceived	   a	  grouped	   stimulus	   or	   not	   lacks	   an	   objective	   standard	   by	   which	   stimuli	   can	   be	  compared.	   An	   alternative	   approach	   is	   to	   simultaneously	   measure	   the	   mismatch	  negativity	  (MMN)	  of	  event	  related	  potentials	  in	  humans,	  whose	  amplitude	  has	  been	  used	   an	   objective	   index	   of	   the	   perceptual	   organization	   of	   the	   stimulus	   (Sussman	  2004,	  Steinschneider	  &	  Sussman	  2006,	  Fujioka	  et	  al	  2004).	  Second,	  another	  possible	  limitation	  is	  that	  we	  pooled	  data	  across	  subjects	  for	  many	  of	  our	  analyses,	  including	  the	   psychophysical	   kernel	   analyses	   as	   well	   as	   the	   fixed	   duration	   and	   hybrid	   task	  DDM	  fits.	  While	  it	  would	  have	  been	  ideal	  to	  collect	  a	  large	  number	  of	  trials	  for	  each	  condition	  for	  each	  subject,	  it	  would	  not	  have	  been	  practical	  to	  do	  so.	  This	  limits	  our	  findings	   because	   there	   may	   have	   been	   subtle	   per-­‐subject	   effects	   that	   could	   have	  been	   the	   result	   of	   IBI	   or	   grouping-­‐related	   effects	   on	   the	   sensory	   evidence	  accumulation	  process	  but	   could	  not	  detect	   due	   to	   the	   lack	  of	   statistical	   power	   for	  per-­‐subject	  inference	  and	  the	  wash-­‐out	  effects	  of	  pooling	  across	  multiple	  subjects.	  	  
Accumulation	  of	  Sensory	  Evidence	  &	  DDM	  findings	  The	   accumulation	   of	   sensory	   evidence	   is	   a	   well-­‐established	   computational	  model	  that	  describes	  how	  multiple	  samples	  of	  sensory	  evidence	  presented	  over	  time	  are	  converted	   into	  a	  decision	  (Gold	  &	  Shadlen	  2007,	  Kiani	  &	  Shadlen	  2013)	  and	   is	  consistent	  with	  our	  findings.	  We	  found	  that	  subjects	  accumulated	  sensory	  evidence	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to	  different	  decision	  criterions,	  which	  varied	  by	  IBI.	  One	  possibility	  to	  for	  subjects	  to	  based	   their	   decisions	   on	   varying	   amounts	   of	   accumulated	   sensory	   evidence	   for	  different	   IBIs,	   could	  be	   that	   subjects	   implicitly	  vary	   their	   speed-­‐accuracy	   trade-­‐off	  criteria	  based	  on	  the	  elapsed	  time.	  That	  is,	  after	  a	  fixed	  period	  of	  time,	  the	  costs	  of	  accumulating	   more	   sensory	   evidence	   outweighs	   any	   benefits	   associated	   with	  improved	  accuracy.	  A	  number	  of	   studies	  have	   found	   that	  human	  and	  non-­‐human-­‐primate	   subjects	  make	   perceptual	   judgments	   based	   on	   an	   accumulation-­‐to-­‐bound	  process	  with	  a	  time-­‐varying	  bound	  (Ditterich	  2006,	  Churchland	  et	  al	  2008,	  Cisek	  et	  al	   2009,	  Hanks	   et	   al	   2011,	  Drugowisch	   et	   al	   2012).	  These	  models	   incorporate	   the	  idea	   that	  subjects	  weigh	  the	  costs	  and	  benefits	  of	  accumulating	  additional	  sensory	  evidence	   as	   a	   trial	   progresses	   and	   adjusts	   the	   decision	   boundary	   accordingly	   to	  determine	  when	  to	  stop	  accumulating	  evidence	  and	  commit	  to	  a	  decision.	  We	  found	  that	  a	  model	   in	  which	  sensory	  evidence	  accumulation	   is	  subject	   to	  a	   time-­‐varying,	  collapsing	  bound	  (Churchland	  et	  al	  2008,	  Hanks	  et	  al	  2011,	  Drugowisch	  et	  al	  2012)	  can	  better	  explain	  our	  response-­‐time	  data	  and	  generate	  kernel	  predictions	  that	  are	  more	  consistent	  with	  our	  observed	  kernels	  than	  a	  fixed	  bound	  model.	  This	  suggests	  that,	   for	   our	   task,	   subjects’	   performance	   agrees	   with	   a	   model	   in	   which	   they	  implicitly	  vary	  their	  speed-­‐accuracy	  tradeoff	  by	  comparing	  the	  costs	  and	  benefits	  of	  the	  accumulating	  additional	  sensory	  evidence	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  elapsed	  time	  and	  not	  the	  number	  of	  samples	  of	  sensory	  evidence.	  	  
Invariance	  of	  Drift	  Rate	  to	  IBI	  &	  Grouping	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Here,	   we	   discuss	   two	   possible	   but	   non-­‐exclusive	   explanations	   for	   the	  accumulation	   of	   sensory	   evidence	   to	   IBI	   and	   to	   the	   perceptual	   grouping	   of	   the	  stimulus.	   The	   first	   possibility	   is	   that	   the	   neural	   mechanisms	   that	   accumulate	  sensory	  evidence	  are	  invariant	  to	  IBI.	  Recent	  work	  suggests	  that	  the	  accumulation	  of	  sensory	   evidence	   indeed	   is	   insensitive	   to	   IBI,	   or,	  more	   generally,	   periods	  without	  stimulus	  present	  (Kiani	  et	  al	  2013,	  Brunton	  &	  Brody	  2013).	  Trial-­‐by-­‐trial	  variability	  in	  the	  choice	  and	  response-­‐times	  of	  an	  auditory	  spatial	  discrimination	  task	  was	  the	  result	   of	   noise	   in	   the	   representation	   of	   sensory	   evidence	   and	   not	   noise	   in	   the	  sensory	   evidence	   accumulation	   process	   (Brunton	   &	   Brody	   2013).	   If	   the	   sensory-­‐evidence	  accumulation	  process	   for	  our	   task	  were	  noisy,	   then	   the	  variability	   in	   the	  accumulated	  evidence	  would	  scale	  with	  the	  listening	  duration	  of	  each	  trial.	  As	  more	  tones	   are	  presented	   for	   a	   given	  period	  of	   time	   for	   short	   IBI	   than	   for	   long	   IBI,	   the	  overall	   signal-­‐to-­‐noise	   ratio	   of	   the	   sensory	   evidence,	   and	   therefore	   the	   rate	   of	  sensory	  evidence	  accumulation,	  would	  decrease	  for	  long	  IBI.	  We	  did	  not	  observe	  an	  IBI	  dependent	  decrease	  in	  the	  drift	  rate	  across	  the	  two	  tasks	  (Fig	  5E,	  for	  response-­‐time	   task	   and	   Fig	   7D	   for	   interrogation	   task)	   suggesting	   that	   the	   accumulation	  process	  for	  our	  task	  may	  be	  an	  instance	  of	  a	  noiseless	  integrator.	  	  Such	  a	  noiseless	   integration	  process	  may	  be	   implemented	  by	  a	  multi-­‐stable	  attractor	  network	  (Kiani	  et	  al	  2013,	  Pouget	  &	  Latham	  2002,	  Koulakov	  et	  al	  2002)	  in	  which	   the	   level	   of	   the	   accumulated	   sensory	   evidence	   does	   not	   decay	   or	   become	  corrupted	   by	   noise	   during	   periods	  without	   any	   stimulus	   present.	  Whether	   such	   a	  
  41 
network	   is	   instantiated	   by	   actual	   neural	   circuits	   for	   our	   task	   to	   noiselessly	  accumulate	  sensory	  evidence	  remains	  to	  be	  explored.	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  noiseless	  accumulation	  mechanism,	  it	  is	  also	  possible	  that	  the	  neural	  circuits	  involved	  in	  auditory-­‐perceptual	  grouping	  are	  separated	  from	  the	  neural	  circuits	  that	  process	  and	  accumulate	  the	  sensory	  evidence	  for	  the	  frequency-­‐change	   judgment.	   The	   computations	   for	   the	   frequency	   direction	   judgment	   and	  grouping	   judgment	   may	   be	   segregated	   along	   the	   dorsal	   and	   ventral	   auditory	  processing	  pathways.	  The	   ventral	   pathway	   is	   thought	   to	  be	   involved	   in	   extracting	  stimulus	  features	  to	  identify	  auditory	  objects	  while	  the	  dorsal	  pathway	  is	  thought	  to	  extract	   spatial	   information	   and	   integrate	   sensory	   and	   motor	   representations	   for	  speech	  perception	  and	  production	  (Rauschecker	  &	  Scott	  2009,	  Bizley	  &	  Cohen	  2013,	  Rauscheker	   2011,	   Hickok	   &	   Poppel	   2007).	   Belt	   regions	   of	   auditory	   cortex,	   which	  receive	   input	   from	   core	   auditory	   cortex,	   show	   the	   first	   signs	   of	   a	   functional	  difference	   in	   their	   neuronal	   tuning	   consistent	   with	   the	   dual	   pathway	   hypothesis.	  The	   ventral	   pathway	   extends	   from	   the	   anterolateral	   belt	   region	   of	   the	   auditory	  cortex	   to	   ventrolateral	   PFC,	   whereas	   the	   dorsal	   pathway	   originates	   in	   the	   caudal	  belt	   region	   of	   the	   auditory	   cortex	   and	   terminates	   in	   the	   dorsolateral	   PFC,	   via	   the	  parietal	  lobe.	  	  On	  one	  hand,	  the	  sensory	  evidence	  for	  the	  frequency-­‐change	   judgment	  may	  be	  processed	  along	  the	  ventral	  processing	  pathway.	  The	  anterolateral	  belt	  regions	  of	  auditory	   cortex,	   which	   are	   part	   of	   the	   ventral	   stream,	   is	   sensitive	   to	   complex	  combinations	  of	  stimulus	  features	  such	  as	  FM	  (Tian	  &	  Rauscheker	  2000)	  and	  have	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long	  temporal	  integration	  windows	  compared	  to	  primary	  auditory	  cortex	  (Scott	  et	  al	  2011).	   The	   conversion	   of	   the	   sensory	   evidence	   to	   a	   categorical	   judgment	   by	   the	  accumulating	  sensory	  evidence	  is	  likely	  to	  take	  place	  downstream	  of	  anteriolateral	  belt	   auditory	   cortex	   in	   ventrolateral	   PFC,	   consistent	   with	   previous	   reports	   of	  auditory	  choice-­‐related	  activity	  in	  vlPFC	  (Russ	  et	  al	  2008).	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  dorsal	  stream	  areas,	  such	  as	  intraparietal	  sulcus,	  may	  be	  involved	   in	   the	  perceptual	  organization	  of	   incoming	  auditory	  stimuli	   into	  different	  streams	  (Teki	  et	  al	  2011,	  Cusak	  2005).	  Whether	  these	  areas	  are	  processing	  temporal	  information,	   consistent	   with	   a	   “when”	   processing	   pathway	   in	   the	   parietal	   lobe	  (Davis	  et	  al	  2009),	  to	  form	  perceptually	  organized	  high-­‐level	  representations	  or	  are	  combining	   sensory	   and	   motor	   information	   for	   guiding	   behavior	   remains	   to	   be	  explored	  in	  the	  future.	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  Figure	  1	  Stimulus	  parameters.	  A-­‐C:	  Examples	  of	  stimuli	  varying	  from	  100%	  -­‐	  0%	  coherence,	  increasing	  in	  frequency.	  D:	  The	  inter-­‐tone	  burst	  interval	  (IBI)	  is	  the	  silent	  period	  between	  successive	  tone	  bursts.	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Figure	  2	  IBI	  affects	  subjects’	  reports	  of	  perceived	  grouping	  of	  stimuli.	  Subjects	  reported	  whether	  they	  perceived	  the	  stimulus	  as	  a	  continuous,	  grouped	  sound	  or	  as	  a	  series	  of	  discrete	  tones.	  Each	  subject	  was	  tested	  with	  a	  method	  of	  constant	  stimulus	  psychometric	  procedure	  across	  four	  separate	  sessions.	  A:	  Psychometric	  function	  for	  each	  subject	  (indicated	  by	  the	  color),	  fit	  to	  response	  data	  and	  IBI,	  pooled	  across	  sessions.	  B:	  Psychometric	  threshold	  IBI	  for	  each	  subject,	  corresponding	  to	  
continuous	  responses	  on	  50%	  of	  trials,	  plotted	  for	  each	  session.	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C. Variable Duration UP vs DOWN & stimulus DISCRETE vs CONTINUOUS task
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Figure	  7	  	  Psychophysical	  kernels	  based	  on	  0%	  coherence	  trials	  (blue	  solid	  curves)	  aligned	  by	  the	  start	  of	  the	  trial	  (A,C)	  and	  by	  when	  the	  choice	  was	  made	  (B,D).	  Kernels	  were	  computed	  using	  logistic	  regression	  with	  data	  from	  the	  response-­‐time	  task,	  pooled	  across	  6	  subjects.	  Red	  solid	  curve	  corresponds	  to	  mean	  of	  bootstrap	  weights	  and	  red	  dotted	  curve	  represents	  +2	  SEM	  for	  the	  bootstrap	  weights.	  The	  kernels	  in	  panels	  A,B	  are	  plotted	  in	  signal	  time	  (tone	  number	  multiplied	  by	  tone	  duration,	  fixed	  at	  30	  ms	  for	  all	  IBIs),	  while	  the	  kernels	  in	  C,	  D	  are	  plotted	  in	  real	  time.	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Figure	  8	  Time-­‐dependent	  psychometric	  data	  (dots)	  and	  DDM	  fits	  (solid	  curves)	  for	  interrogation	  task	  on	  A:	  10	  ms,	  B:	  60	  ms,	  C:	  150	  ms	  IBI	  trials.	  The	  colors	  in	  A-­‐C	  correspond	  to	  the	  coherences	  tested.	  D:	  Plot	  of	  fitted	  DDM	  drift	  coefficients	  for	  the	  three	  IBI	  conditions	  (circle)	  and	  their	  associated	  bootstrapped,	  95%	  confidence	  intervals.	  	   	  












































































Drift rate vs. IBI
A B
C
10 ms IBI 60 ms IBI
150 ms IBI D
  51 
Figure	  9	  Time-­‐dependent	  psychometric	  data	  (dots)	  and	  DDM	  fits	  (red	  solid	  curves)	  for	  the	  hybrid	  task	  in	  A.	  Prior	  to	  each	  session,	  the	  50%	  IBI	  threshold	  for	  perceiving	  the	  stimulus	  as	  a	  single,	  continuous	  sound	  versus	  a	  discrete	  series	  of	  tones	  was	  measured	  for	  each	  subject.	  Subjects	  were	  then	  run	  on	  the	  hybrid	  task	  using	  this	  threshold	  IBI.	  The	  data	  for	  the	  threshold	  IBI	  was	  separated	  by	  the	  subjects’	  report	  of	  perceived	  continuity	  for	  analysis.	  B:	  Plot	  of	  fitted	  DDM	  drift	  rates	  (circle	  symbols)	  for	  the	  separately	  analyzed	  hybrid	  task	  data	  at	  the	  threshold	  IBI	  and	  their	  associated	  bootstrapped	  95%	  confidence	  intervals.	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Chapter	  3	  
General	  Discussion	  &	  Conclusions	  
Our	  study	  establishes	  a	  new	  auditory	  decision	  making	  paradigm	  to	  test	  how	  sensory	   information	   is	   converted	   into	   a	   perceptual	   judgment.	   We	   used	   a	   novel	  auditory-­‐discrimination	   task	   that	   required	   human	   subjects	   to	   report	   whether	   a	  stochastic	  auditory	  stimulus	  was	   increasing	  or	  decreasing	   in	   frequency.	  Using	   this	  task,	  we	  examined	  how	  temporal	  gaps	  in	  a	  stimulus,	  which	  can	  affect	  the	  perceptual	  grouping	   of	   the	   stimulus,	   can	   also	   affect	   the	   computations	   that	   convert	   sensory	  evidence	  into	  a	  perceptual	  judgment.	  By	  understanding	  how	  the	  brain	  converts	  the	  sensory	  stimulus	  into	  a	  perceptual	  decision	  with	  our	  task,	  we	  can	  better	  understand	  the	   computational	   principles	   and	   the	   neural	   implementation	   of	   how	   auditory	  perceptions	  are	   represented	   in	   the	  brain.	  We	  will	  discuss	   first,	   how	   timing	  affects	  the	   perceptual	   grouping	   of	   our	   stimulus,	   second,	   how	   our	   task	   provides	   evidence	  that	   the	   decision	   making	   processes	   are	   insensitive	   to	   IBI	   and	   to	   the	   perceptual	  grouping	  of	  the	  stimulus,	  and	  finally,	  future	  directions	  to	  extend	  our	  findings.	  	  IBI	  &	  Perceptual	  Organization	  The	   timing	   of	   acoustic	   events	   can	   affect	   how	   they	   are	   perceived.	   We	  characterized	   how	   IBI,	   or	   the	   temporal	   gaps	   in	   our	   tone	   sequences,	   affected	   the	  perceptual	   grouping	   the	   stimulus.	   We	   found	   that	   by	   varying	   the	   IBI	   of	   our	   tone	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sequences,	   listeners	  indeed	  perceive	  our	  stimuli	  differently.	  At	  short	  IBIs,	   listeners	  tend	   to	   perceive	   the	   stimulus	   as	   a	   continuous,	   grouped	   sound,	   and	   at	   long	   IBIs,	  listeners	  perceive	  the	  stimulus	  as	  a	  series	  of	  discrete	  tones.	  By	  varying	  the	  IBI	  of	  our	  stimulus,	  subjects	  could	  perceive	  the	  stimulus	  as	  grouped	  or	  as	  a	  discrete	  series	  of	  tones.	  	  Our	   findings	   add	   to	   the	   types	   of	   stimuli	   that	   can	   be	   used	   to	   study	   how	  stimulus	   features	   can	   affect	   how	   sounds	   are	   perceptually	   organized.	   Auditory	  perceptual	   organization	   is	   typically	   studied	   using	   the	   “ABA”	   streaming	   paradigm	  (van	   Noorden	   1975,	   Bregman	   1994,	   Moore	   &	   Gockel	   2012).	   The	   “ABA”	   stimulus	  consists	  of	  repeating	  “A”	  and	  “B”	  tones,	  which	  different	  frequencies.	  Specifically,	  for	  the	   “ABA”	   stimulus,	   faster	   presentation	   rates	   or	   larger	   frequency	   separations	  between	   the	   “A”	   and	   “B”	   tones	   are	   perceived	   as	   separate	   streams	   at	   the	   two	  frequencies.	   For	   slower	   presentation	   rates	   and	   smaller	   frequency	   separations,	  listeners	  perceive	  the	  stimulus	  as	  a	  galloping	  sound,	  representing	  one	  stream.	  This	  paradigm	   set	   the	   groundwork	   for	   understanding	   how	   perceptual	   grouping	   of	   the	  stimulus	  is	  affected	  by	  changes	  in	  the	  acoustic	  features	  of	  the	  stimulus.	  However,	  the	  “ABA”	  stimulus,	  as	  we	  have	  established,	  is	  not	  the	  only	  stimulus	  that	  can	  be	  used	  to	  study	  the	  principles	  of	  sequential	  auditory	  perceptual	  grouping.	  How	  might	  the	  auditory	  system	  process	  the	  grouping	  cues	  in	  our	  stimulus?	  A	  number	  of	  models	  (Beauvois	  &	  Meddis	  1996,	  Hartman	  &	  Johnson	  1991)	  have	  been	  developed	   to	   explain	   how	   frequency-­‐separation	   can	   affect	   the	   perception	   of	  streaming	   with	   the	   “ABA”	   streaming	   paradigm.	   These	   models	   are	   based	   on	   the	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frequency	   selectivity	   and	   adaptation	   properties	   of	   neurons	   in	   primary	   auditory	  cortex.	   Stream	   segregation	   occurs	   when	   distinct	   populations	   of	   neurons	   are	  activated.	  For	  example,	   the	  population	  of	  neurons	  responding	  to	   two	  tones	  closely	  separated	   in	   frequency	  would	  be	  overlapping	  and	  therefore	  represent	  one	  stream.	  On	   the	   other	   hand,	   for	   two	   tones	   separated	   far	   apart	   in	   frequency,	   two	   distinct	  populations	   of	   neurons	   would	   be	   responding	   to	   the	   stimulus,	   and	   therefore	   the	  stimulus	  would	  be	  perceived	  as	  two	  streams.	  These	  population-­‐based	  models	  could	  explain	  how	  listeners	  can	  perceive	  a	  grouped	  sound	  based	  on	  the	  frequency	  content	  of	   our	   stimulus,	   since	   coherent	   tones	   are	   separated	   by	   7.5	   hz,	  which	   is	   a	   smaller	  frequency	   separation	   than	   the	   bandwidth	   of	   primary	   auditory	   cortex	   neurons	  (Recanzone	  et	  al	  2000).	  However,	   these	  population-­‐based	  models	  do	  not	   take	   into	  account	  the	  relative	  timing	  of	  the	  different	  sound	  elements	  in	  a	  stimulus,	  which	  can	  have	  a	  large	  impact	  on	  how	  the	  stimulus	  is	  perceived.	  	  One	  model	  that	  takes	  into	  account	  the	  temporal	  structure	  of	  the	  stimulus	  is	  the	   temporal-­‐coherence	   model	   (Elhilali	   2009,	   Shamma	   et	   al	   2010).	   This	   model	  extends	   previous	   frequency-­‐separation	   based	  models	   of	   streaming	   to	   account	   for	  the	   timing	   between	   acoustic	   events	   in	   the	   perceptual	   organization	   of	   sounds.	  According	   to	   the	   temporal	   coherence	  model,	   sounds	   that	   are	   closely	   separated	   in	  time	  and	  have	  a	  common	  rhythm,	  even	  if	  they	  are	  separated	  in	  frequency,	  will	  evoke	  temporally	  coherent	  activity	  across	  the	  neural	  population.	  The	  temporal	  coherence	  model	  can	  mirror	  human	  subjects’	  performance	  on	  a	  challenging	  auditory	  stochastic	  figure-­‐ground	  detection	   task	   in	  which	  subjects	  detect	   the	  presence	  of	  a	  multi-­‐tone	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sequence	   embedded	   in	   a	   simultaneously	   presented	   random	   chord	   distractor	  stimulus	  (Teki	  et	  al	  2013).	  	  An	   open	   question	   is	   whether	   the	   brain	   perceptually	   organizes	   sounds	   by	  using	  the	  temporal	  coherence	  of	  neural	  populations	  representing	  the	  stimulus.	  One	  possible	   mechanism	   that	   is	   consistent	   with	   the	   temporal-­‐coherence	   model	   is	   the	  phase	   entrainment	   of	   stimulus-­‐evoked	   oscillations	   acting	   as	   a	   spectrotemporal	  filter.	   This	   filtering	   mechanism	   boosts	   the	   excitability	   of	   the	   neural	   populations	  corresponding	  to	  the	  temporally	  coherent	  stimuli	  and	  selectively	  attenuates	  activity	  of	  neural	  populations	  corresponding	  to	  the	  temporally	  incoherent	  sounds	  (Lakatos	  et	  al	  2013).	  Whether	  phase-­‐entrainment	  can	  be	  extended	  to	  more	  complex	  stimuli	  and	  be	  tested	  in	  awake,	  behaving	  animals	  remain	  to	  be	  seen.	  In	   humans,	   the	   perceptual	   organization	   of	   a	   stimulus	   activates	   the	  intraparietal	   sulcus	   (Teki	   et	   al	   2010,	   Cusack	   2005).	   Using	   the	   stochastic	   figure-­‐ground	   stimulus	   in	  which	   a	   tone	   sequence	   is	   embedded	   in	   a	   sequence	   of	   random	  chords,	  the	  detection	  of	  the	  target	  tone-­‐sequence	  was	  correlated	  with	  activity	  in	  IPS,	  suggesting	   that	   this	   area	   contains	   an	   anatomical	   substrate	   for	   processing	   the	  perceptual	   organization	   of	   the	   stimulus.	   The	   IPS	   receives	   input	   from	   caudal	   belt	  regions	  of	  auditory	  cortex	  (Lewis	  &	  van	  Essen),	  and	  in	  non-­‐human	  primates	  lateral	  intraparietal	   cortex	   (LIP)	   an	   area	   in	   the	   IPS	   has	   been	   shown	   to	   be	   involved	   in	  integrating	  spatial	  localization	  of	  an	  auditory	  stimulus	  and	  planning	  motor	  behavior	  (Cohen	   &	   Gifford)	   as	   well	   as	   forming	   high-­‐level	   categorical	   representations	  independent	   of	   PFC	   activity	   (Freedman	  &	   Assad	   2006,	   Swaminathan	   et	   al.	   2012),	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suggesting	  that	  the	  parietal	  cortex	  may	  play	  a	  role	  in	  high-­‐level	  auditory	  perceptual	  processes	  such	  as	  the	  perceptual	  organization	  of	  an	  acoustic	  stimulus.	  Whether	  IPS	  plays	  a	  role	  in	  representing	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  perceptual	  organization	  process	  or	  in	   actively	   processing	   the	   stimulus	   to	   perceptually	   organize	   the	   sounds	   sounds	  remains	  to	  be	  examined	  in	  the	  future.	  	  	  Sensory	  Evidence	  Accumulation	  The	  accumulation	  of	  sensory	  evidence	  is	  a	  general	  computational	  model	  for	  explaining	   how	   sensory	   evidence	   is	   converted	   to	   a	   perceptual	   decision.	   Auditory	  tasks	  are	  no	  exception	  to	  this	  model.	  Our	  goal	  has	  been	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  role	  of	  time	  in	  auditory	  perception	  and	  by	  examining	  how	  sensory	  evidence	  is	  processed	  to	  form	  a	  perceptual	  judgment,	  we	  can	  examine	  how	  auditory	  processing	  may	  process	  time	  differently.	   We	   found	   that	   subjects	   accumulate	   sensory	   evidence	   to	   make	   their	  frequency-­‐change	   judgments.	   In	   particular,	   subjects	   integrated	   sensory	   evidence	  over	   a	   fixed	   period	   of	   time	   independent	   of	   IBI,	   consistent	   with	   an	   accumulation-­‐based	  perceptual	  decision	  making	  model	  with	  a	  collapsing	  decision	  boundary	   that	  took	   into	   account	   the	   costs	   and	   benefits	   of	   accumulating	   additional	   sensory	  evidence.	  We	  also	  found	  that	  the	  drift	  rate,	  which	  is	  a	  measure	  of	  the	  signal-­‐to-­‐noise	  of	   the	   sensory	   evidence	   and	   the	   rate	   of	   sensory	   evidence	   accumulation	   was	  independent	  of	  IBI.	  	  Our	   finding	   that	   subjects	   integrate	   sensory	   evidence	   over	   a	   fixed	   period,	  consistent	  with	   a	   collapsing	   bound	   decision-­‐making	  model	   suggests	   that	   listeners	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making	  auditory	  judgments	  also	  adjust	  their	  strategy	  according	  to	  the	  difficulty	  and	  speed	  of	   the	   judgments.	  Subjects	   in	   the	  response-­‐time	  task	  appear	  to	  compare	  the	  costs	  and	  benefits	  of	  accumulating	  additional	  sensory	  evidence	  in	  terms	  of	  elapsed	  time	   and	   not	   by	   the	   number	   of	   samples	   of	   sensory	   evidence.	   While	   we	   did	   not	  impose	  any	  explicit	  costs	  or	  rewards,	  finishing	  the	  trials	  as	  quickly	  as	  possible	  and	  as	  accurately	  as	  possible	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  an	  implicit	  reward	  for	  our	  task.	  Because	  trial	  parameters	   such	   as	   IBI,	   coherence,	   and	   the	   absolute	   frequencies	   of	   the	   stimulus	  sequence	   varied	   between	   trials,	   in	   order	   to	   efficiently	   complete	   the	   experimental	  task,	   subjects’	   strategies	   had	   to	   take	   into	   account	   the	   considerable	   variability	   in	  difficulty	  across	  trials.	  While	  examining	  the	  role	  of	  the	  decision	  bound	  was	  not	  the	  focus	  of	  this	  work,	  it	  would	  be	  useful	  in	  the	  future	  to	  examine	  directly	  each	  subject’s	  cost	   function	   to	   determine	   how	   subjects	   weighed	   the	   costs	   and	   benefits	   to	  accumulating	  additional	   information	  and	  to	  allow	  for	  a	  direct	  comparison	  with	  the	  cost	   function	  for	  human	  subjects	  on	  a	  visual	  discrimination	  task	  (Drugowisch	  et	  al	  2012).	  	  Our	   main	   result	   is	   that	   the	   sensory	   evidence	   accumulation	   process	   was	  invariant	  to	  IBI	  and	  to	  the	  grouping	  of	  the	  stimulus.	  Our	  findings	  are	  consistent	  with	  recent	  work	  showing	  that	  accumulation	  of	  sensory	  evidence	  is	  insensitive	  to	  gaps	  in	  the	   stimulus	   (Kiani	   et	   al	   2013,	   Brunton	  &	   Brody	   2013).	   In	   one	   study,	   subjects	   in	  made	  a	  decision	  regarding	  which	  one	  of	  two	  stochastic,	  Poisson	  pulse	  trains	  had	  the	  higher	   rate.	   The	   trial-­‐by-­‐trial	   variability	   in	   the	   choice	   and	   response-­‐times	   in	   this	  auditory	   spatial	   discrimination	   task	   was	   found	   to	   be	   the	   result	   of	   noise	   in	   the	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representation	   of	   sensory	   evidence	   and	   not	   noise	   in	   the	   sensory	   evidence	  accumulation	  process	  (Brunton	  &	  Brody	  2013).	  A	  separate	  study	  found	  that	  a	  time	  gap	  between	  two	  distinct	  stimulus	  pulses	  did	  not	  affect	  subjects’	  performance	  on	  a	  visual	  motion	  direction	  discrimination	   task	   (Kiani	  et	   al	  2013).	   If	   the	  accumulation	  process	  for	  our	  task	  were	  noisy,	  the	  accumulator	  noise	  present	  during	  the	  silent	  IBI	  periods	  would	  be	  added	  to	  the	  accumulated	  sensory	  evidence.	  As	  IBI	  increased	  the	  amount	  of	  noise	  accumulated	  along	  with	  the	  incoming	  sensory	  evidence	  would	  also	  increase,	   leading	   to	   an	  overall	   increase	   in	   the	   variability	   in	   the	   total,	   accumulated	  sensory	   evidence.	   This	   increase	   in	   the	   variability	   of	   the	   accumulated	   sensory	  evidence	  would	  correspond	  to	  a	  decrease	  in	  the	  drift	  rate	  (Ratcliff	  et	  al	  2002,	  Voss	  et	  al	   2004),	  which	  we	   did	   not	   observe,	   suggesting	   that	   a	   noiseless	   sensory	   evidence	  accumulation	  process	  may	  be	  able	  to	  account	  for	  the	  invariance	  of	  the	  drift	  rate	  to	  IBI.	   This	   noiseless	   integration	   process	   may	   be	   implemented	   by	   a	   multi-­‐stable	  attractor	  network	  (Kiani	  et	  al	  2013,	  Pouget	  &	  Latham	  2002,	  Koulakov	  et	  al	  2002).	  These	  network	  models	  use	  biologically	  plausible	  assumptions	  to	  construct	  a	  neural	  network	   which	   replicates	   some	   aspect	   of	   the	   target	   system.	   For	   the	   multi-­‐stable	  attractor	  networks,	  the	  level	  of	  the	  accumulated	  sensory	  evidence	  does	  not	  decay	  or	  become	  corrupted	  by	  noise	  during	  periods	  without	  any	  stimulus	  present.	  Whether	  	  actual	   neural	   circuits	   instantiate	   such	   a	   network	   and	   how	   such	   circuits	   might	  function	  for	  our	  task	  remain	  to	  be	  explored	  and	  could	  provide	  insights	  into	  how	  the	  brain	  converts	  the	  auditory	  stimulus	  into	  a	  perceptual	  judgment.	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In	  addition	  to	  the	  noiseless	  accumulation	  mechanism,	  it	  is	  also	  possible	  that	  the	  neural	  circuits	  involved	  in	  auditory-­‐perceptual	  grouping	  are	  separated	  from	  the	  neural	  circuits	  that	  process	  and	  accumulate	  the	  sensory	  evidence	  for	  the	  frequency-­‐change	   judgment.	   The	   computations	   for	   the	   frequency	   direction	   judgment	   and	  grouping	   judgment	   may	   be	   segregated	   along	   the	   dorsal	   and	   ventral	   auditory	  processing	  pathways.	  The	   ventral	   pathway	   is	   thought	   to	  be	   involved	   in	   extracting	  stimulus	  features	  to	  identify	  auditory	  objects	  while	  the	  dorsal	  pathway	  is	  thought	  to	  extract	   spatial	   information	   and	   integrate	   sensory	   and	   motor	   representations	   for	  speech	  perception	  and	  production	  (Rauschecker	  &	  Scott	  2009,	  Bizley	  &	  Cohen	  2013,	  Rauscheker	   2011,	   Hickok	   &	   Poppel	   2007).	   Belt	   regions	   of	   auditory	   cortex,	   which	  receive	   input	   from	   core	   auditory	   cortex,	   show	   the	   first	   signs	   of	   a	   functional	  difference	   in	   their	   neuronal	   tuning	   consistent	   with	   the	   dual	   pathway	   hypothesis.	  The	   ventral	   pathway	   extends	   from	   the	   anterolateral	   belt	   region	   of	   the	   auditory	  cortex	   to	   ventrolateral	   PFC,	   whereas	   the	   dorsal	   pathway	   originates	   in	   the	   caudal	  belt	   region	   of	   the	   auditory	   cortex	   and	   terminates	   in	   the	   dorsolateral	   PFC,	   via	   the	  parietal	  lobe.	  	  On	  one	  hand,	  the	  sensory	  evidence	  for	  the	  frequency-­‐change	   judgment	  may	  be	  processed	  along	  the	  ventral	  processing	  pathway.	  The	  anterolateral	  belt	  regions	  of	  auditory	   cortex,	   which	   are	   part	   of	   the	   ventral	   stream,	   is	   sensitive	   to	   complex	  combinations	  of	  stimulus	  features	  such	  as	  FM	  (Tian	  &	  Rauscheker	  2000)	  and	  have	  long	  temporal	  integration	  windows	  compared	  to	  primary	  auditory	  cortex	  (Scott	  et	  al	  2011).	   The	   conversion	   of	   the	   sensory	   evidence	   to	   a	   categorical	   judgment	   by	   the	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accumulating	  sensory	  evidence	  is	  likely	  to	  take	  place	  downstream	  of	  anteriolateral	  belt	   auditory	   cortex	   in	   ventrolateral	   PFC,	   consistent	   with	   previous	   reports	   of	  auditory	  choice-­‐related	  activity	  in	  vlPFC	  (Russ	  et	  al	  2008).	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  dorsal	  stream	  areas,	  such	  as	  intraparietal	  sulcus,	  may	  be	  involved	  in	  the	  perceptual	  organization	  of	  incoming	  auditory	  stimuli	  into	  different	  streams	  (Teki	  et	  al	  2011,	  Cusak	  2005).	  Whether	  these	  areas	  are	  processing	  temporal	  information,	  consistent	  with	  a	  “when”	  processing	  pathway	  in	  the	  parietal	  lobe	  (Davis	  et	  al	  2009),	  to	  form	  perceptually	  organized	  high-­‐level	  representations	  or	  are	  combining	  sensory	  and	  motor	  information	  for	  guiding	  behavior	  remains	  to	  be	  explored	  in	  the	  future.
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